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COMBATING CORRUPTION IN 
NIGERIA: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF 
THE LAWS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE 
POLITICAL WILL 
OSITA NNAMANI OGBU· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Corruption is pervasive and widespread in Nigerian society. It has 
permeated all facets of life, and every segment of society is involved. In 
recent times, Nigeria has held the unenviable record of being considered 
one of the most corrupt countries among those surveyed I. The Political 
Bureau, set up under the Ibrahim Babangida regime, summed up the 
magnitude of corruption in Nigeria as follows: 
It [corruption] pervades all strata of the society. From 
the highest level of the political and business elites to the 
ordinary person in the village. Its multifarious 
manifestations include the inflation of government 
contracts in return for kickbacks; fraud and falsification 
of accounts in the public service; examination 
* Senior Lecturer, and Ag. Head, Department of Commercial and Property Law, Anambra 
State University, Igbariam, Nigeria 
1. See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION 
Perceptions Index (1996 - 2(05), 
http://www.transparency.orglpolicy_research/surveys_indiceslcpi. Nigeria, however, recorded some 
improvement in the 2006 Corruption Perception Index. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2006, 7 (2006), available at 




Ogbu: Combating Corruption in Nigeria
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008
100 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. XIV 
malpractices in our educational institutions including 
universities; the taking of bribes and perversion of 
justice among the police, the Judiciary and other organs 
for administering justice; and various heinous crimes 
against the state in business and industrial sectors of our 
economy, in collusion with multinational companies 
such as over-invoicing of goods, foreign exchange 
swindling, hoarding and smuggling. At the village level, 
corruption manifests itself in such forms as adulteration 
of market goods or denting of measures to reduce their 
contents with a view to giving advantage to the seller. 2 
Other manifestations of corruption in Nigeria today include the buying of 
votes, election rigging and malpractices, the use of money to sway the 
national and state assemblies, and political donations by private 
corporations. 
President Olusegun Obasanjo, upon coming to power for a second time 
on May 31, 1999, promised that fighting corruption would be one of the 
policy thrusts of his administration. Accordingly, the first bill he 
forwarded to the National Assembly was the Corrupt Practices and Other 
Related Offenses bill, which became the Corrupt Practices and Other 
Related Offenses Act of 2000 (hereinafter the "Act").3 The provisions of 
the Act set up the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offenses Commission (hereinafter the "ICPC").4 Subsequently, the 
Legislature enacted the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act 
of 2004 which, in tum, established the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission.s President Obasanjo established, among other initiatives 
throughout the Presidency, a policy and programmes monitoring unit6 
and a Due Process Office.7 This paper seeks to critically examine the 
legal and institutional framework for combating corruption that existed 
before Nigeria's nascent democracy, and the anti-corruption mechanisms 
and measures put in place by the Obasanjo regime. The effectiveness of 
2. DIRECfORATE FOR SOCIAL MOBIUSATION, REPORT OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU at 212-219 
(1987). 
3. Corrupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, (2000) No. 5 (Nigeria). Nigerian 
statutes, including the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, are available at, 
http://www.nigeria-Iaw.org. 
4. Id. § 3(1). 
5. Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, (2004) § I (Nigeria) 
available at, www.efcc.nig.org. 
6. See "Nigeria: From Pond of Corruption to Island of Integrity" being the text of a lecture 
delivered by President Obasanjo at the 10th Anniversary Celebration of Transparency International, 
Berlin, Nov 7, 2003; the Guardian, Thur Nov 13,2003 p. 8. 
7. See The ABC of the Contract Due Process Policy available at, www.brnpiu.gov.ng. 
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the laws and the institutions and their limitations will be considered. 
Lastly, the political will to fight corruption will also be examined. 
II. THE MEANING OF CORRUPTION 
Corruption is a word with so many facets and ramifications that it cannot 
be easily defined. The World Bank has defined corruption as "the abuse 
of public office for private gain."8 According to the World Bank, a 
public office is abused for private gain when an official accepts, solicits, 
or extorts a bribe.9 Further, abuse of a public office occurs when private 
agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes 
for competitive advantage and profit.lO Even if no bribery occurs, public 
office can be abused for personal benefit as well, through patronage and 
nepotism, the theft of state assets, and the diversion of state revenue. 11 
These definitions are deficient, however, in that they are concerned 
only with public sector corruption, thereby ignoring corruption in the 
private sector. 
Additionally, Transparency International (hereinafter "TI") has defined 
corruption as "the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit."12 This 
definition appears to be as deficient as the World Bank's definition. 
"Entrusted power" suggests power within a public office, however, in 
some cases it may also arise in private matters. Furthermore, corruption 
may involve an exercise of power neither expressly nor implicitly 
granted. 
In the Nigerian case of Biobaku v. Police,13 Bairarnian, J. defined 
corruption as the receiving or offering of some benefit as a reward or 
inducement to sway or deflect the receiver from the honest and impartial 
discharge of his duties. However, this definition appears to define 
bribery more so than corruption because corruption is a wider concept 
that encompasses bribery. In effect, corruption may occur without the 
element of receiving or offering some benefit as a reward or inducement 
8. THE WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE 
WORLD BANK 8-9 (1997), available at, 
http://wwwl. worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorruptlcorruptn/corrptn.pdf. See also PROBLEMS OF 
CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA 4 - 5 (Ignatius Anyua et al. eds., Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies, 2002) (quoting the World Bank definition). 
9. THE WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE 
WORLD BANK 8-9 (1997). 
10. [d. 
II. [d. 
12. JEREMY POPE, TI SOURCE BOOK 2000: CONFRONTING CORRUPTION: THE ELEMENTS OF A 
NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM 13 (2000), available at , 
http://www.transparency.org/contentldownloadl2439/14493/file/sourcebook.pdf.zip. 
13. Biobaku v. Police [1951]20 N.L.R. 30 (Nigeria). 
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to sway or deflect the receiver from the honest and impartial discharge of 
his duties. 
Assisi Asobie, a renowned professor of political science at the University 
of Nigeria, defined corruption as "unethical behaviour or practice."14 
According to Professor Asobie, corrupt activity is that which violates the 
ethics of society in general, or the ethics of one's office, position, 
profession, or calling, where ethics means a system of morals, the rules 
governing behavior, or standards of conduct. 15 This definition is so wide 
that it defeats its own meaningl6 and may result in confusion of thought 
and analysis. In legal parlance, corruption normally means conduct 
prohibited by law. Going by Asobie's definition, there may be some 
unethical conducts which, though not illegal, nevertheless qualify as 
corruption. There may also be unethical conduct that does not amount to 
corruption. For example, it is unethical for a person to slap his father, 
yet this does not amount to corruption, strictly speaking. 
Lateef Adegbite also adopts the moralist approach in defining corruption. 
He defined corruption as "moral deterioration, depravity and perversion 
of integrity by bribery or favour."I? He said that corruption in its widest 
sense "connotes the perversion of anything from its original state of 
purity, a kind of infection or infected condition."18 According to 
Adegbite, corruption in its most basic sense means acting or inducing an 
act with the intent of improperly securing an advantage. 19 This definition 
suffers from the same defects as that of Professor Asobie. In legal 
parlance, an act or omission which constitutes corruption must be 
prohibited by law at the pain of punishment. Furthermore, a person 
involved in corruption may seek to secure an improper advantage for 
another person rather than himself. 
Unfortunately, the Nigerian Criminal Code, the Penal Code, and the 
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Act of 2000 do not provide 
a sufficient definition of corruption. For instance, Section 2 of the Act 
provides that "corruption" includes "bribery, fraud, and other related 
14. Professor Assisi Asobie, Remarks at the Transparency International Workshop in Abuja, 
Nigeria: Corruption in Campaign Financing and Party Funding p. 3 (August 2000). 
15. [d. 
16. It must be stated, however, that Professor Asobie recognized that his definition is a broad 
one.; See [d. at 6. 
17. Lateef Adegbite, Towards the Evolution of a Corrupt Free Society: The Role and Duties of 
the Citizenry, in PERSPECfNE ON CORRUPTION AND OTHER ECONOMIC CRIMES IN NIGERIA (Bola 
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offenses. "20 In the light of the shortcomings of the definitions of 
corruption highlighted above, I define corruption as an abuse of position 
or inducement of an abuse of position for an undeserved benefit, 
advantage or relief. Corruption, in the context of this work, includes all 
forms of economic crimes. 
III. THE PRE-EXISTING LEGAL MECHANISM FOR 
COMBATING CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA PRIOR TO THE 
CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED OFFENSES 
ACT 2000 
Both the Nigerian Criminal Code and the Penal Code, which are 
comprehensive sets of criminal laws that apply in Southern and Northern 
Nigeria, contain provisions aimed at tackling corruption in the public 
sector. The two Codes prohibit both the demand for and the receipt of 
bribes by public officers,21 as well as the giving and offering of bribes to 
public officers. 22 However, the provisions of the Criminal Code on 
corruption are so technical and complicated, that otherwise guilty 
persons normally escape punishment.23 The provisions on corruption in 
the Penal Code are more lucid and less technical. Of course, at the time 
these Codes were enacted, corruption had not become as large in scope 
as it has today. 
Both the Criminal and Penal Codes contain glaring inadequacies. First, 
they do not address corruption in the private sector. Second, there is the 
likelihood that charges will be brought under the wrong Section of the 
law. This may lead to a strong possibility of unmerited acquittals 
because the Criminal Code failed to simplify the offense of corruption.24 
Finally, both codes fail to widen the scope of the offense.25 
20. Corrupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, (2000) No.5, § 2 (Nigeria). 
21. Criminal Code Act, (1990) Cap. 77, §§ 98, 99, 101 - 103; Penal Code (Northern States) 
Federal Provisions Act, (1990) Cap. 345, §§ 115-122 (Nigeria). 
22. Criminal Code Act, (1990) Cap. 77, §§ 98; Penal Code (Northern States) Federal 
Provisions Act, (1990) Cap. 345, §§ 115-122 (Nigeria). 
23. The Court observed in Amechi v. Comm'r of Police [1958) N.R.N.L.R. 123, 126 
(Nigeria) that the law relating to official corruption and kindred offenses is not easy and that the 
advice of law officers should be sought whenever possible before proceedings are taken. For 
instance, in Rex v. Anyaleme [1943)9 W.A.C.A. 23 (Nigeria), a police constable was induced by a 
bribe of five pounds not to prosecute an offender for forgery. It was held that the accused was 
wrongly convicted under Section 98 of the Criminal Code. The appropriate Section should have 
been Section 116(2). 
24. [d. 
25. See the observations of Professor Taiwo Osipitan and Oyelowo Oyewo to this effect in 
their paper "Structuring Measures Against Corruption for Sustainable Development" presented at the 
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In their application, the two Codes were grossly inadequate in dealing 
with cases of corruption as corruption increased throughout the country.26 
Accordingly, many of the military regimes, which sought to justify their 
intervention into governance on the need to cleanse the nation of corrupt 
practices, enacted various military decrees on the subject of corruption 
offenses.27 The ad hoc measures adopted by the various military regimes 
to combat corruption did not normally outlive the particular regime that 
adopted the measure. For instance, the two regimes that demonstrated 
their genuine intention to combat corruption - the Murtala Mohammed 
and the BuhariJldiagbon regimes - were so short-lived that the measures 
put in place by them did not take roOt.28 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM 
The Constitution has a number of provisions which seek to eradicate or 
reduce corruption. Such provisions include the provision under the 
fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy; the 
provision for separation of powers and checks and balances; the 
provision for audit of public accounts; and the provision for the code of 
conduct.29 
A. THE FuNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES AND DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF 
STATE POLICY 
Section 15(5) of the 1999 Constitution under the fundamental objectives 
and directive principles of state policy requires the state to abolish 
corrupt practices and abuse of power.30 Under Section 13 of the 
Constitution, all organs of the government are required to conform to and 
observe the provisions of the chapter on fundamental objectives and 
directive principles of state policy.3l Item 60(a) of the exclusive 
Nigerian Association of Law Teachers Conference held at Lagos State University, Ojo, 
April 23 - 26. 2007 at II. 
26. !dat 11-12. 
27. See Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree No. 51 (1966), (Nigeria); 
Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Decree No. 37 (1968); Investigation of 
Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) (Amendment) Decree No. 43 (1968); Corrupt Practices 
Decree No. 38 (1975); Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunals) Decree No.3 
(1984); Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunals) (Amendment) Decree No.8 
(1984); Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunals) (Amendment No.2) Decree No. 14 
(1984); Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunals) Decree No.3 (1984). (All are 
Nigerian legislation.) 





See CONSTITUTION, Art. 4 -12,13 - 24,85,172, Fifth Schedule (1999) (Nigeria). 
CONSTITUTION, Art. 15(5) (1999) (Nigeria). 
CONSTITUTION, Art. 13 (1999) (Nigeria). 
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Legislative list empowers the National Assembly to make laws for the 
establishment and regulation of authorities for the federation, or any part 
thereof, and to promote and enforce the observance of the fundamental 
objectives and directive principles contained in the Constitution.32 In 
A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Federation & 35 Ors,33 the Ondo State 
Government challenged the competence of the National Assembly to 
enact the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Act No. 5 of 
2000. The Supreme Court held that the National Assembly is 
empowered under item 60(a) of the exclusive legislative list, to create 
necessary legislation to establish and regulate the ICPC for the federation 
(a body established to eradicate corrupt practices in consonance with 
Section 15(5) of the Constitution).34 
B. SEPARATION OF POWER AND CHECKS AND BALANCES 
The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria is anchored on the principle of 
separation of power. The doctrine of separation of power is subject to 
the twin principle of checks and balances. One of the legislative checks 
on the Executive is the power of investigation conferred on the 
Legislature by the Constitution. Article 88 of the Constitution confers on 
the Legislature the power to investigate, among other things, the conduct 
of any person, authority, ministry or government department charged 
with the responsibility of executing or administering laws enacted by the 
National Assembly, or disbursing or administering moneys appropriated 
or to be appropriated by the National Assembly.35 Under Article 88(2), 
the purpose of the power conferred by Article 88( 1) is to enable the 
Legislature to: 
(a) make laws with respect to any matter within its 
legislative competence and correct any defects in 
existing laws; and 
(b) expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste in the 
execution or administration of laws within its legislative 
competence and in the disbursement or administration of 
funds appropriated by it. 36 
32. CONSTITUTION, Second Schedule (Exclusive Legislative List). Item 60(a) (1999) (Nigeria). 
33. A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Federation & 35 Ors, [2002) 9 N.W.L.R. (pt 772) 222 (Nigeria). 
Similar decisions were also reached in Re: Chief Adebiyi OIafisonye [2004) A.F.W.L.R. (pt 198) I 
(Nigeria); Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Anache [2004)14 W.R.N. 1 (Nigeria). 
34. A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Federation & 35 Ors, [2002)9 N.W.L.R. 222 (Nigeria). 
35. CONSTITUTION, Art. 88 (1999) (Nigeria). 
36. [d. 
7
Ogbu: Combating Corruption in Nigeria
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008
106 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. XIV 
The stark reality, however, is that the Nigerian Legislature is not 
independent of the Executive. 
First, the majority of the state houses of assembly exist only in name, 
primarily to rubber-stamp Executive acts. In the case of the National 
Assembly, a combination of factors has made it a lap-dog of the 
Executive. Adolphus Wabara, the former President of the Senate, was 
never elected.37 From initial results released by the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (hereinafter "INEC"), he lost the senatorial 
election to Elder Dan Imo.38 Events later took on a new twist when news 
circulated that Adolphus Wabara was the candidate President Olusegun 
Obasanjo wanted for the office of Senate President based on his past 
loyalty to the President.39 Suddenly, other results of the same election 
began to emerge.40 One of the subsequent results declared Wabara the 
winner of the election. Wabara, who had gone to the election tribunal in 
Umuahia to challenge his defeat, later withdrew the case from the 
tribunal and left for Abuja, where he obtained an ex-parte order directing 
INEC to release the certificate of return to the rightful winner of the 
election.41 INEC issued a certificate of return to Wabara on June 2, 
2003.42 On June 3, 2003, he was elected Senate President.43 Naturally, 
Wabara cowered before the President.44 
Second, as a result of the undemocratic internal structure of the ruling, 
the People's Democratic Party (hereinafter "PDP") maintained a policy 
that if any member of the National Assembly raises a serious voice 
against the actions of the Executive, he has no chance of being 
nominated by the party for a second term.45 Before the last general 
elections, the National Chairman of the PDP allegedly circulated a list of 
National Assembly members who were qualified for nomination based 
on their past loyalty to the Executive.46 Under these circumstances, all 
the legislators who had sought to assert the independence of the 







44. Wabara, for instance, said that the Senate under his presidency would not talk of 
impeaching the President; See Abiodun Adeniyi, The Senate Won't Talk Impeachment, 
THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), June 15,2003 at 11. 
45. See John Abba-Ogbodo, Party Primaries and the Emerging Legislature, THE GUARDIAN 
(Nigeria), Mar 4, 2003 at 8. 
46. The list was called "unity list"; See also note 45, supra. 
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Legislative arm lost their nominations.47 This remains a lesson to the 
incumbent legislators. 
Third, Nigeria is still at the "bread and butter" level of politics. In other 
words, most people are concerned with subsistence; consequently, the 
Executive, which controls the purse of the nation, exerts considerable 
influence. For example, the Executive applies direct monetary 
inducements to direct the course of proceedings in the Legislature.48 In a 
recent case, Professor Fabian Osuji, a former Minister for Education, 
revealed that it is common practice for ministries to bribe legislators to 
get their budgets passed.49 The former Minister mobilized a total of W55 
million from his ministry and the National Universities Commission to 
bribe some members of the National Assembly, including the former 
Senate President Adolphus Wabara, to ensure that the education 
ministry's vote increased.50 President Olusengun Obasanjo, in a national 
broadcast, announced the dismissal of the Education Minister.51 While 
admitting the scam, the Minister said, inter alia, " ... what the Federal 
Ministry of Education did ... is common knowledge and practice at all 
levels of government - Federal, State and Local .... "52 Senator 
Adolphus Wabara was forced to resign as Senate President.53 The former 
Senate President, the former Minister of Education, four senators, and a 
member of the House of Representatives were arraigned before an Abuja 
High Court for their involvement in the scam. 54 As demonstrated above, 
the absence of true separation of powers and checks and balances in 
Nigeria has rendered legislative oversight of the Executive illusory in 
matters of corruption. 
C. PUBLIC ACCOUNTS AUDIT 
One of the measures provided for in the Constitution for monitoring 
corruption is the auditing process of public accounts. Section 125 of the 
1999 Constitution provides as follows: 
47. Id. At 8-9. 
48. See The Ekwueme Panel's Report on the Crisis Between the Legislature and the Executive, 
VANGUARD (Nigeria), Dec. 22, 2000, at 15. It was found that money actually changed hands in the 
National Assembly for the purpose of removing the speaker. 





53. Olu Ojewale, The Road Down The Valley, NEWSW ATCH (Nigeria), Apr. 4,2005 at 24. 
54. Anza Phillips, Dockedfor Bribe, NEWSWATCH (Nigeria) Apr. 25,2005 at 17. 
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(1) There shall be an Auditor-General for the federation 
who shall be appointed in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 86 of this Constitution. 
(2) The public accounts of the federation and of all 
offices and courts of the federation shall be audited and 
reported on by the Auditor-General who shall submit his 
reports to the National Assembly; and for that purpose, 
the Auditor-General or any person authorized by him in 
that behalf shall have access to all the books, records, 
returns and other documents relating to those accounts. 
(3) The Auditor-General shall have power to conduct 
periodic checks of all government statutory 
corporations, commlsszons, authorities, agencies, 
including all persons and bodies established by an Act of 
the National Assembly. 
(4) The Auditor-General shall, within ninety days of 
receipt of the Accountant-General's financial statement, 
submit his reports under this Section to each House of 
the National Assembly and each House shall cause the 
reports to be considered by a Committee of the House of 
the National Assembly, responsible for public accounts. 
(5) In the exercise of his functions under the 
Constitution, the Auditor-General shall not be subject to 
the direction or control of any other authority or 
person. 55 
The essence of the public account process is to ensure that the 
expenditure on projects and programs is in accordance with the sums and 
projects the Legislature has appropriated. According to Rule 91(e)(2),(3) 
and (4) of the standing rules of the House of Representatives,56 when the 
Auditor-General's Report is laid before the House, the House must refer 
it to the Public Accounts Committee of the House, who examines the 
report and makes recommendations to the House.57 The House is then 
55. See CONSTITUTION, Cap. V, § 125 (1999) (Nigeria) (noting the position of Auditor-General 
of the State). 
56. The Senate and the State Houses of Assembly have similar rules. 
57. See the Standing Rules of both Houses of the National Assembly, available 
at, www.nationalassembly.nigeria.com. 
10
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required to consider the report of the Public Accounts Committee.58 
Similar provisions exist for the states. 
Unfortunately, these provisions garner attention more often when they 
are breached. With respect to the National Assembly, no Auditor-
General's Report was received in 1999,2000 or 2001.59 The then Acting 
Auditor-General of the Federation, Pius Akubueze, and his immediate 
successor, Joseph Ajiboye, failed to produce the requisite report as well.60 
When the Senate twice rejected the nomination of Mr. Ajiboye as the 
substantive Auditor-General of the Federation, his second in command, 
Vincent Azie, was appointed by President Obasanjo in an acting 
capacity. 
Mr. Azie, as the Acting Auditor-General of the Federation, submitted a 
report to the National Assembly. From the report, a summary of the 
amounts misappropriated by the various ministries are as follows: 
Ministry Amount Misappropriated 
Co-operation and Integration 10 10,453,573,241.81 
Africa 
Power and Steel 4,394,649,602.19 
Works and Housing 2,262,877,023.15 
Defence 1,785,877,023.15 
Education 1,265,272,388.99 





59. See Ita Jarnes-Evang, Legal Issues on Public Accounts and Appropriations, VANGUARD 
(Nigeria), Aug. 9, 2002 at 27. 
60. THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Editorial, Feb. 10, 2003 at 16 (considered the issuance of the 
Auditor-General's Report by Azie as a watershed as it was the first of its kind). 
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Industry 356,064,369.12 
Total 23,860,732,145.2061 
The audit report further disclosed that, while the Government recorded 
estimated expenditure for the 2000 fiscal year audit period as N206.4 
billion, the actual expenditure incurred for the year stood at N404.8 
billion.62 According to the report, the Government made payments out of 
five revenue overheads amounting to N398.8 million, contrary to the 
provision of the financial regulations, which stipulates that gross accruals 
received must, in all cases, be accounted for in full.63 The report also 
indicted both the National Assembly and the Federal Judiciary.64 
Immediately after the report was presented, the Federal Government, 
through the then Minister for Information, Professor Jerry Gana, openly 
castigated the acting Auditor-General and subsequently removed him 
from office.65 The Federal Government later explained that Mr. Azie was 
not removed, but that his tenure of acting appointment had lapsed.66 Mr. 
Joseph Ajiboye, who had served as Acting Auditor-General, and whose 
nomination by the President in 2002 as the substantive Auditor-General 
was twice rejected by the Senate, was appointed as the Auditor-General 
of the Federation67 and the new Senate confmned the appointment. 
The Public Accounts Committee of the House of Representatives 
subsequently conducted public hearing sessions in which accounting 
officers of various government departments questioned in the Auditor-
General's report could provide explanations as to the queries.68 The 
Findings of the Public Accounts Committee disclosed grave financial 
misconducts as those of the Auditor-General. The Committee, in a 











THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), The Auditor-General's Repon: Matters Arising, Feb. 27, 2003 
66. See Abiodun Adeleja, Gani Gives 2-Weeks' Ultimatum Over Azie, DAILY CHAMPION 
(Nigeria), Feb. 28, 2003 at 3. 
67. See note 65, supra, See also Government and the Auditor-General's Repon, 
THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Feb. 10,2003 at 16. 
68. HOUSE COMM. ON PuB. ACCOUNTS, Summary of Findings and Recommendations on the 
Examination Conducted on Ministries and Agencies on Auditor-General's Reports on the Accounts 
of the Federation (1998-2001); Author Unknown, Status Report on Some ParastataIs Mid-Session's 
Report, THE NEWS MAGAZINE (Nigeria), Mar. 21, 2005 at 27. 
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Although there is a remarkable improvement in the 
management of public funds from what it used to be 
prior to 1999, there is still tremendous degree of 
recklessness and waste, even in the present state of 
affairs. 
Cases of theft, destruction of records, circumvention of 
rules, connivance to defraud government by public 
officials and their collaborators, etc are also still 
t 69 rampan ... 
111 
D. THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PUBLIC OFFICERS UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION 
The Code of Conduct is one of the mechanisms instituted by the 
Constitution for identifying corruption among public officers. The Code 
of Conduct is contained in the 5th schedule to the Constitution.70 Under 
Sections 172 and 209 of the Constitution, persons in both Federal and 
State public services are required to conform to and observe the Code of 
Conduce l The Code of Conduct requires a public officer to abstain from 
putting himself in a position where his personal interests will conflict 
with his official duties.72 The Code of Conduct also prohibits the 
President, Vice-President, Governors, Deputy Governors, Ministers, 
Commissioners, and members of the National and State Assemblies and 
such other public officers as prescribed in law by the National Assembly 
from maintaining or operating a foreign bank account.73 
A public officer is also prohibited from accepting property or benefits of 
any kind for himself or on behalf of any other person as payment for any 
commission or omission performed by him in the discharge of his 
duties.74 Under paragraph 6(2) of the Fifth Schedule, "the receipt by a 
public officer of any gifts or benefits from commercial firms, business 
enterprises, or persons who have contracts with the government shall be 
presumed to have been received in contravention [of paragraph 6(1)] 
unless the contrary is proved. "75 
69. Id. The Senate Committee on Public Accounts made similar findings. See THISDAY 
(Nigeria), Senate Report on Public Accounts, Sept. 7, 2004 at 13. 
70. CONSTITUTION, Fifth Schedule (1999) (Nigeria). 
71. Id. at Art. 172, 209. 
72. Id. at Fifth Schedule, Part I, 'I I. 
73. Id. at Fifth Schedule, Part I, 'I 3. 
74. Id. at Fifth Schedule, Part I, 'I 6. 
75. Id. at Fifth Schedule, Part I, '16(2). 
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According to paragraph 7(b), the President or Vice-President, Governor 
or Deputy Governor, Minister of the Government of the Federation or 
Commissioner of the Government of a State, or any other public officer 
who holds the office of a permanent Secretary or head of public 
corporation, university, or other parastatal or organization, is prohibited 
from "accepting any benefit of whatever nature from any company, 
contractor, or businessman, or the nominee or agent of such person."76 
Paragraph 8 prohibits bribery of public officers.77 Paragraph 11(1) 
requires that every public officer shall, immediately after taking the oath 
of office, every four years thereafter, and at the end of his term of office, 
submit to the Code of Conduct Bureau a written declaration of all his 
(and those of his minor children) properties, assets, and liabilities.78 
"Any property or assets acquired by a public officer after the asset 
declaration ... which is not fairly attributable to his income or gift, or 
loan approved by [the] Code shall be deemed to have been acquired in 
breach of [the] Code unless the contrary is proved."79 The spirit behind 
the declaration of assets is for the system to record the material worth of 
a public officer at the time of taking office, and compare the person's 
material worth at the time of leaving office. 
Under paragraph 3 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution, the Code of 
Conduct Bureau is to receive the asset declarations, examine them to 
ensure compliance with the Constitutional requirements, and "retain 
custody of such declarations and make them available for inspection by 
any citizen of Nigeria on such terms and conditions as the National 
Assembly may prescribe."80 Unfortunately, the National Assembly has 
not enacted any law prescribing such terms and conditions. Under these 
circumstances, the Code of Conduct Bureau has refused to make asset 
declarations available upon request to Nigerian citizens.s' This is a 
serious impediment to the asset declaration mechanism because it is only 
when they are made available to the citizens that false declarations can 
be easily reported. 
The Code of Conduct prohibits a public officer, except where he is 
employed on a part-time basis, from engaging or participating in the 
management or running of any private business, profession, or trade, 
76. Id. at Fifth Schedule, Part L 'lI 7(b). 
77. Id. at Fifth Schedule, Part L 'lI S. 
7S. Id. at Fifth Schedule, Part L 'lI 11(1). 
79. Id. at Fifth Schedule, Part L 'lI 11(3). 
SO. Id. at Third Schedule, Part L 'lI 3(a) - (c). 
SI. Lemmy Ughegbe, Why We Can't Publish Pubic [Sic] Officers' Assets, By Conduct 
Bureau, 1HE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), May 23, 2007 at 7. 
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except farming. 82 However, this provision is essentially unenforced. The 
country's wage policy appears to be fictional, and employees accept it 
with a tacit understanding that they will pursue other income generating 
opportunities. For instance, the minimum wage in the public service is 
about N 6,500.00 per month (approximately $50.80). 
In Okoye v. Santilli,83 the Supreme Court held that a public officer is 
precluded by the Code of Conduct from engaging in any other business, 
in violation of Section 20(1) of the Code of Conduct Bureau Act.84 
Accordingly, the Court held that a contract entered into by one of the 
Defendants while still a public officer is illega1.85 The majority of the 
Supreme Court overruled the earlier case of Ogbuagu v. Ogbuagu86 in 
which it was held that only the Code of Conduct Bureau and the Code of 
Conduct Tribunal could entertain allegations of breach of the Code of 
Conduct.87 
However, in Nwankwo v. Nwankwo,88 the Supreme Court clarified the 
meaning of engaging in business when it held that the provision of 
paragraph 2(b) of part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the 1979 Constitution is 
not intended to prevent any public officer from acquiring an interest in a 
business (e.g., a partnership).89 However, it did prohibit a public officer 
from engaging or participating in the management and running of any 
private business, profession or trade (to hold a managerial or other 
position in such an undertaking or solely to run the same).90 The court 
further reached the disturbing decision that the Code of Conduct does not 
create a private right or interest for which a person could claim relief.91 
Its purpose, according to the Court, is to protect public interest, but a 
private citizen has no locus standi to prosecute its contravention or claim 
82. Constitution, Fifth Schedule, Part I, '112 (1999) (Nigeria). 
83. Okoye v. Santilli, [1994]4 N.W.L.R. (pt 338) 256,289 (Nigeria). 
84. Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, (1990) Cap. 56 § 20(1) (Nigeria). The Act was 
enacted under the regime of Ibrahim Babangida to energize the Constitutional provision on the Code 
of Conduct for Public Officers. It is now an existing law within the meaning of Section 315 of the 
1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
85. Okoye v Santilli (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt 388) 256. 
86. Ogbuagu v. Ogbuagu [1981]2 N.C.L.R. 680 (Nigeria). 
87. Id. 
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relief as a result thereof.92 The earlier case of Okoye V. Santilli93 was 
neither cited to the court, nor did the court refer to it suo motu.94 
A Code of Conduct Bureau is established under the Third Schedule of 
the Constitution to ensure compliance with and enforcement of the Code 
of Conduct. Paragraph 15(1) of part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the 
Constitution establishes a Code of Conduct Tribunal.95 The Tribunal has 
the power to try cases of alleged infractions of the Code of Conduct and 
to impose appropriate sanctions once the Tribunal determines a person is 
guilty.96 
The Code of Conduct has some advantages over other corruption-
fighting mechanisms. First, it has Constitutional authority so the 
constitutionality of its provisions cannot be challenged. Second, the 
Officers of the Code of Conduct Bureau or Code of Conduct Tribunal 
have secured tenures under the Constitution, which may make them 
independent or impartial.97 
The Code of Conduct should not be subject to criminal or civil immunity 
for the President, Vice-President, Governors and Deputy Governors 
under Section 308 of the Constitution. Unfortunately, an Abuja High 
Court has interpreted the Code of Conduct to be subject to the Immunity 
Clause.98 The former Governor of Plateau State, Joshua Dariye, was 
arrested in 2004 by the Metropolitan Police in London for money 
laundering.99 When a charge was filed against him in Nigeria before the 
Code of Conduct Tribunal, alleging that he had concealed a foreign 
account, an Abuja Federal High Court held the trial to be 
unconstitutional because it violated the Immunity Clause. 100 
Additionally, the Code of Conduct has been crippled due to inadequate 
funding and lack of enabling legislation to activate some of the 
Constitutional provisions. The reason for crippling the Code of Conduct 
is not far-fetched. Top members of the Executive and the Legislature are 
92. [d. 
93. Okoye v. Santilli, [1994]4 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 338) 256 (Nigeria). 
94. [d. 
95. CONSTITUTION, Fifth Schedule, Pan I, ,)[15(1) (1999) (Nigeria). 
96. See [d. at Fifth Schedule, Pan I, 'll'll15 -18. 
97. See [d. at Third Schedule, Pan I, ,)[4, Fifth Schedule, Pan I, ,)[16. 
98. Joshua Chibi Dariye v. Code of Conduct Bureau & 2 Ors Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CSI50712004 
(Unreported Judgment of Adah J of Federal High Court, Abuja delivered on 6 December, 2004 
at 1). 
99. See Shola Oshunkeye and Olukorede Yishau, There 'lmmuned' Excellencies, TELL 
(Nigeria), Dec. 20, 2004 at 22-23. See also Wilson Uwujaren and Akin Orimolade, How Dariye 
Had His Day, TELL (Nigeria), Nov. 29,2004 at 34. 
100. THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Dec. 2, 2004, at I. 
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known violators of the Code of Conduct. For instance, while the Code 
prohibits the President, Vice-President and some other categories of 
public officers from receiving gifts and donations from individuals or 
corporations who are currently executing government contracts, 
President Obasanjo and Vice President Atiku Abubakar received the 
following donations towards their campaign for a second term: 
SIN SOURCE AMOUNT (N) 
Friends of Atiku 1 billion 
Aliko Dangote 250 million 
Emeka Offor 200 million 
21 PDP Governors 210 million 
Group from Europe 1 million 
Rivers friends of Obasanjo/Atiku 150 million 
Grand Alliance Boeing 727; two luxury buses 
Construction companies in the country 200 million 
Dr. Sampson Uche 50 million 
PDP caucus in Senate 12 million 
Principal Officers of the presidency 10.6 million 
AVM Shekeri 10 million 
First Atlantic Bank 10 million 
Ministers 10 million 
Otunba Fasawe 6.5 million 
50 Government parastatals 5 million 
PDP National Working Committee 5 million 
17
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Dr. Ngozi Anyaegbunam 500,000 
Dr. Gamaliel Onosode 100,000 
Corporate Nigeria (Ltd. By Guarantee) 2 billionlOl 
These donations were in clear violation of paragraph 7(b) of the Code of 
Conduct. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court held that these 
donations do not amount to the standard of a corrupt practice. In Yusufv. 
Obasanjo lO2 (though in obiter), the Court effectively held that political 
donations to President Obasanjo do not constitute undue influence, nor 
do they connote a corruptible act. If the rule of law was strictly observed 
in Nigeria, President Obasanjo would have been charged before the Code 
of Conduct Tribunal for violating the Code of Conduct for Public 
Officers. 
Members of the Legislature also violate the provisions of the Code of 
Conduct with impunity. A recent letter from the Code of Conduct 
Bureau indicated that more than six months after they assumed office, 29 
Senators and 48 members of the House of Representatives have yet to 
declare their assets. 103 Yet Section 52 of the Constitution requires every 
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives to declare his assets 
before taking his seat. 104 One cannot understand why the Code of 
Conduct Bureau chose to bring the matter before the clerk of the 
National Assembly, rather than the Code of Conduct Tribunal, as 
prescribed by the Constitution. 
V. THE CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED 
OFFENSES ACT 2000 REGIME 
Upon coming to power as a civilian President, the first bill General 
Obasanjo forwarded to the National Assembly was the Corrupt Practices 
and Other Related Offenses Bill, which became the Corrupt Practices 
and Other Related Offenses Act of 2000.105 The Act, however, did not 
repeal the existing corruption laws. Rather, it recognized the power of 
101. Ehichioya Ezomon & Fred Okoror, Campaign Finance: Donations or Buying Up the 
Democratic Process, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), lan. 24, 2003, at 23. 
102. Yusuf v. Obasanjo, [2003] 16 N.W.L.R. (pt. 847) 554,641-642 (Nigeria). 
103. Alifa Daniel & Azimazi Momoh limoh, 28 Senators, 48 Reps Yet to Declare Assets, Says 
Bureau, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Dec. 12, 2003, at 64. 
104. CONSTITUTION, Art. 52 (1999) (Nigeria). 
105. Corrupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, (2000) No.5 (Nigeria). 
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the Independent Corrupt Practices and Related Offenses Commission 
("ICPC"), created by the Act, to prosecute persons who violate existing 
laws on corruption. 106 The following discussion addresses the offenses 
created by the Act. 
A. GRATIFICATION BY AN OFFICIAL 
According to Section 8( 1) of the Act, it is an offense for any person to 
ask for, receive, or obtain any property or benefit of any kind for himself 
or for any other person, or to agree or to attempt to receive or obtain any 
property or benefit of any kind for himself or for any other person on 
account of: 
a) anything already done or omitted to be done, or for 
any favour or disfavour already shown to any person by 
himself in the discharge of his official duties or in 
relation to any matter connected with the junctions, 
affairs or business of a Government department, or 
corporate body or other organisation or institution in 
which he is serving as an official; or 
b) anything to be afterwards done or omitted to be 
done or favour or disfavour to be afterwards shown to 
any person, by himself in the discharge of his official 
duties or in relation to any such matter as aforesaid . .. 107 
The punishment for this offense of official corruption is seven years 
imprisonment. 108 Section 8(2) creates the presumption of a corrupt gift 
against a public officer, which is similar to Section 98 of the Criminal 
Code. 109 However, while the opening words of Section 98 read "Any 
public official", Section 8 employs the phrase "Any person."11O The 
intention may be to widen the scope of Section 8 of the Act. In fact, the 
Supreme Court in Biobaku v. Police ll1 found that the purpose of a similar 
provision under the Criminal Code was to address the receipt or offer of 
some benefit as a reward or inducement to sway or deflect a person 
employed in the public service from the honest and impartial discharge 
of his duties. 
106. [d. at § 26(2) 
107. [d. at § 8(1). 
108. [d. 
109. [d. at § 8(2); see Criminal Code Act, (1990) Cap. 77, § 98 (Nigeria). 
110. [d. 
Ill. Biobaku Y. Police, [1951]20 N.L.R. 30 (Nigeria). 
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Section 9 of the Act extends liability to the giver or promisor of a bribe 
punishable by seven years imprisonment. 112 It is an offense, under 
Section 10 of the Act, for any person to ask for bribes for himself or for 
any other person on account of something done or to be done or omitted 
to be done by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties.ll3 
B. FRAUDULENT ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY 
According to Section 12 of the Act: 
[alny person who, being employed in the public service, 
knowingly acquires or holds, directly or indirectly, 
otherwise than as a member of a registered joint stock 
company consisting of more than twenty (20) persons, a 
private interest in any contract, agreement or investment 
emanating from or connected with the department or 
office in which he is employed or which is made on 
account of the public service, is guilty of an offense and 
shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for seven 
(7) years. 114 
This provision is aimed at preventing people in official positions from 
awarding contracts to themselves or to organizations in which they have 
substantial interest. Moreover, Section 12 is similar to Section 161 of the 
Criminal Code. 115 
C. FRAUDULENT RECEIPT OF PROPERTY 
Based on Section 13 of the Act, it is an offense for any person to receive 
anything which has been obtained by means of a felony or misdemeanor, 
or by means of any act done in a place outside Nigeria, which, if done in 
Nigeria, would have constituted a felony or misdemeanor, and which is 
an offense under the laws in force in the place where it was done, 
provided that the person knows same to be so obtained. 116 Section 13 is 
similar to the first paragraph of Section 427 of the Criminal Code. 117 
112. Conupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, (2000) No.5, § 9 (Nigeria). 
II3. Id. at § 10. 
II4. Id. at § 12. 
II5. Id. 
116. Conupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, (2000) No.5, § 13 (Nigeria). 
II7. Id. 
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D. MAKING FALSE STATEMENT OR RETURN 
Section 16 makes it an offense for any officer in charge of receiving or 
managing property to knowingly furnish any false statements or returns 
with respect to any money or property within his possession, control or 
care, lIS Punishment for the offense is seven years imprisonment. 119 
E. GRATIFICATION BY OR THROUGH AGENTS 
Section 17 prescribes a punishment of five years imprisonment for 
corruptly offering or giving a gift or consideration to an agent as an 
inducement for doing or omitting to do any act or thing in relation to his 
principal's business:2o The Section also prescribes punishment for an 
agent who, with intent to deceive his principal, knowingly uses any 
receipt, account, or document in which his principal is interested and 
which contains a false, erroneous or defective statement, and which to 
his knowledge is intended to mislead his principal or any other person. 121 
F. BRIBERY OF PUBLIC OFFICER 
Section 18 of the Act prohibits and punishes any person from offering, 
soliciting or aiding a public officer in accepting any gratification as an 
inducement or reward for the following: 
(a) Voting or abstaining from voting at any meeting of 
the public body in favour or against any measure, 
resolution or question submitted to the public body; 
(b) Peiforming or abstaining from peiforming or aiding 
in procuring, expediting, delaying, hindering or 
preventing the peiformance of any official act; 
( c) Aiding in procuring or preventing the passing of any 
vote or the granting of any contract, award, recognition 
or advantage infavour of any person . .. 
118. Corrupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, (2000) No.5, § 16 (Nigeria). 
119. /d. 
120. /d. at § 17. 
121. /d. 
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(d) shall . .. be guilty of an offense and shall on 
conviction be liable to five (5) years imprisonment with 
hard labour. 122 
Section 18(a) above is intended to catch members of the Executive, who 
use financial inducements to dictate the course of proceedings in the 
Legislature. The Section also applies to legislators who accept such 
inducements, or members of contract-awarding public bodies who 
receive inducements to vote in favor of a particular bidder. 
G. USING OFFICE FOR GRATIFICATION 
Section 19 of the Act provides that: 
Any public officer who uses his office or pOSltlOn to 
gratify or confer any corrupt or unfair advantage upon 
himself or any relation or associate of the public officer 
or any other public officer shall be guilty of an offense 
and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for 
five (5) years without option of fine. 123 
This provision covers cases of discretional abuse in the distribution of 
public benefits. However, it is only when the abuse is for the advantage 
of the particular person, his relation, his associate, or any other public 
officer, that liability under the provision will arise. 
H. FORFEITURE OF GRATIFICATION 
Section 20 of the Act is a praiseworthy novelty in criminal law of the 
country relating to corruption. The Section provides as follows: 
Without prejudice to any sentence of imprisonment 
imposed under this Act, a Public Officer or other person 
found guilty of soliciting, offering or receiving 
gratification shall forfeit the gratification and pay a fine 
of not less than five times the sum or value of the 
gratification which is the subject-matter of the offense 
where such gratification is capable of being valued or is 
122. /d. at § 18. 
123. Id. at § 19. 
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of a pecuniary nature, or ten thousand Naira, whichever 
is the higher. 124 
I. DUTY TO REpORT BRIBERY TRANSACTIONS 
121 
Section 23 is of special significance. Section 23(1) requires any public 
officer to whom any gratification is given, promised, or offered, to report 
such transaction to the nearest officer of the ICPC or police officer. '25 
Section 23(2) also provides that "any person from whom any 
gratification has been solicited or obtained, or from whom an attempt has 
been made to obtain such gratification shalL .. , at the earliest opportunity 
thereafter, report such soliciting or obtaining, or attempt to obtain the 
gratification" to the nearest Officer of the Commission or a police 
officer. 126 Under Section 23(3), "any person who fails, without 
reasonable excuse, to comply with subsections (1) and (2) [of Section 23] 
shall be guilty of an offense and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not 
exceeding N 100,000 or imprisoned for a term not exceeding two years 
or to both fine and imprisonment."127 
J. BRIBERY FOR GIVING ASSISTANCE WITH REGARD To A CONTRACT 
Section 22 catalogues all aspects of corruption in relation to contract 
awards. Any person who gives money or any other advantage to a public 
servant and in return is awarded a contract is guilty of an offense 
punishable by seven years imprisonment. 128 The same punishment awaits 
a public servant who, without lawful excuse, solicits or accepts such 
advantage arising from contract awards. '29 Inflation of contract prices or 
over-invoicing is now punishable by seven years imprisonment and a 
fine of N 1,000,000.130 
K. CONCEALMENT OF PROPERTY ACQUIRED THROUGH GRA TIFICA TION 
Concealment of any property obtained in contravention of Sections 10, 
11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19 and 20, whether within or outside the country is 
an offense punishable with five years imprisonment. '31 
124. Id. at § 20. 
125. ld.at§23(1). 
126. ld. at § 23(2). 
127. ld. at § 23(3). 
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L. FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY UPON PROSECUTION FOR AN OFFENSE 
Section 47 is significant in preventing unjust enrichment of a person, 
even when the person has not been convicted, if the prosecution failed to 
meet the requisite standard of proof (in criminal cases) or for any other 
reason. The Section provides: 
(1) In any prosecution for an offense under [the] Act, 
the Court shall make an order for the forfeiture of any 
property which is proved to be the subject-matter of the 
offense or to have been used in the commission of the 
offense where 
(a) The offense is proved against the accused; or 
(b) The offense is not proved against the accused but the 
court is satisfied: 
(i) that the accused is not the true and lawful owner of 
such property; and 
(ii) that no other person is entitled to the property as a 
purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration. 
(2) Where the offense is proved against the accused or 
the property referred to in subSection (1) has been 
disposed of, or cannot be traced, the court shall order 
the accused to pay as a penalty a sum which is 
equivalent to the amount of the gratification or is, in the 
opinion of the court, the value of the gratification 
received by the accused, and any such penalty shall be 
recoverable as a fine. 132 
M. INVESTIGATION OF THE PRESIDENT OR GOVERNOR 
Section 52 of the Act provides that when allegations of corruption are 
made against the President, Vice President, Governor or Deputy 
Governor, an independent counsel appointed by the Chief Justice of the 
Federation will investigate.133 The independent counsel's report should 
be forwarded to the National Assembly or the relevant State House of 
Assembly. While Section 308 of the Constitution confers immunity on 
132. Id. at § 47. 
133. Id. at § 52. 
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these Chief State Executives from civil or criminal process while in 
office,134 the Court of Appeals held in Fawehinmi v. Bola Tinubu l35 that 
the police have the discretion to decide whether to investigate a State 
Executive while in office. 136 
N. INDEPENDENT CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED 
OFFENSES COMMISSION 
Section 3 of the Act establishes the ICPC. 137 The functions of the ICPC 
are described in Section 6 of the Act as follows: 
6. It shall be the duty of the Commission: 
(a) where reasonable grounds exist for suspecting that 
any person has conspired to commit or has attempted to 
commit or has committed an offense under this Act or 
any other law prohibiting corruption, to receive and 
investigate any report of the conspiracy to commit, 
attempt to commit or the commission of such offense 
and, in appropriate cases, to prosecute the offenders; 
(b) to examine the practices, systems and procedures of 
public bodies and where, in the opinion of the 
Commission, such practices, systems or procedures aid 
or facilitate fraud or corruption, to direct and supervise 
a review of them; 
(c) to instruct, advise and assist any officer, agency or 
parastatals on ways by which fraud or corruption may 
be eliminated or minimised by such officer, agency or 
parastatal; 
(d) to advise heads of public bodies of any changes in 
practices, systems or procedures compatible with the 
effective discharge of the duties of the public bodies as 
the Commission thinks fit to reduce the likelihood or 
incidence of bribery, corruption, and related offenses; 
134. CONSTITUTION, Art. 308 (1999) (Nigeria). The Supreme Court affirmed the position in 
IMB Securities PLC v. Tinubu, [2(01)45 W.R.N. 1,22 (Nigeria). 
135. Fawehinmi v. Bola Tinubu [2(02)7 N.W.L.R. 21 (Nigeria). 
136. Id. 
137. Corrupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, (2000) No.5, § 3 (Nigeria). 
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(e) to educate the public on and against bribery, 
corruption and related offenses; and 
(j) to enlist and foster public support tn combating 
corruption. 138 
The ICPC has broad authority to search, seize, investigate, inspect, and 
examine: persons,139 records of financial institutions, shared accounts, 
and the contents of safe deposit boxes. l40 An officer of the ICPC, when 
investigating or prosecuting a case of corruption, has all the powers and 
immunities of a police officer under the Police Act and other laws 
empowenng and protecting the Police and other law enforcement 
agents. 141 
The constitutionality of the Act was at issue in A.G. Ondo State V. A.G. 
Federation. 142 The Attorney-General of Ondo State filed an originating 
summons in the Supreme Court against the Attorney-General of the 
Federation and joined the Attorney Generals of the other 35 States as co-
defendants in the suit. The plaintiff sought, inter alia, a determination of 
whether the Act was valid and enforceable as law enacted by the 
National Assembly and applicable in every State of the Federal Republic 
, of Nigeria (including Ondo State ).143 The plaintiff also sought an order 
for a permanent injunction, restraining the Attorney-General of 
Federation from exercising any powers vested in him by the Constitution 
or any other law respecting criminal offenses created by provisions 
contained in the Act. l44 The plaintiff contended, inter alia, that the Act 
deals with matters which are neither in the Exclusive nor Concurrent 
Legislative list and, therefore, the enactment of the Act was ultra vires 
the Legislative powers of the National Assembly and, consequently, 
unconstitutional. The National Assembly can only legislate with respect 
to matters on either the Exclusive or Concurrent Legislative list. 145 
The Supreme Court held, in a unanimous decision, that the Act was 
constitutional. l46 The Court held that since, by virtue of Section 4(2) of 
the 1999 Constitution, the National Assembly has the power to make 
laws for the Federation respecting any matter included in the Exclusive 
138. [d. at §§ 6(a) - (t). 
139. [d. at §§ 27-41. 
140. [d..at §§ 37(2) - (3). 
141. [d. at § 5(1). 
142. A.G. Ondo State V. A.G. Federation, [2002]9 N.W.L.R. (pt. 772) 222 (Nigeria). 
143. [d. 
144. [d. 
145. Id. at 286-287. 
146. [d. 
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Legislative list, it follows that the National Assembly is empowered to 
legislate under item 60(a) of the Exclusive Legislative list for the 
purpose of establishing and regulating the ICPC. 147 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held some Sections of the Act 
unconstitutional. The Court held that the power given by Section 35 of 
the Act to the ICPC to arrest and detain a person indefinitely until the 
person complies with the summons, violates the provision of Section 35 
of the 1999 Constitution, which guarantees the fundamental right to 
personal liberty. 148 Section 35 of the Constitution provides that a person 
arrested for a criminal offense, must be charged within a reasonable time 
or released on bail. I49 Reasonable time is defined as: 24 hours, provided 
there is a court of competent jurisdiction within a 40 kilometer radius 
from the place of arrest, and 48 hours, where there is no such court 
within that radius. 150 
The Supreme Court also held Section 26(3) of the Act unconstitutional 
because it infringes on separation of power principles. 151 Section 26(3) 
prescribes that prosecution of an offense, under the Act, be concluded 
and judgment delivered within 90 working days of commencing 
prosecution. 152 According to the Supreme Court, it is a direct 
interference with the Judiciary for the National Assembly to prescribe 
when the court should conclude particular matters. 153 With due respect, 
this proposition cannot be supported. The Supreme Court said the 
Section is unconstitutional without citing any provision of the 
Constitution the Section violates. l54 Section 26(3) of the Act finds 
support in Section 36(4) of the Constitution, which provides that any 
person who is charged with a criminal offense should be tried within a 
reasonable time. 155 
The Supreme Court relied upon the case of Unongo v. Aku, which must 
be understood within its context. 156 In that case, the National Assembly 
enacted the Electoral Act of 1982.157 Under the Electoral Act, Section 
147. Id. at 304. 
148. Id. at 309-310. 
149. CONSTITUTION, Art. 35 (1999) (Nigeria). 
150. A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Federation, [2002] 9 N.W.L.R. (pt. 772) 222 (Nigeria). 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 309-310. 
154. Id. 
155. Corrupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, (2000) No.5, § 26(3) (Nigeria); 
CONSTITUTION, Art. 36(4) (1999) (Nigeria). 
156. Unongo v. Aim, [1983]2 S.C.N.L.R. 332 (Supreme Court of Nigeria). 
157. Id. 
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129(3) provided that election petition proceedings before a high court 
had to be completed no later than thirty days from the election. 15s 
Section 119(4) required that such a petition had to be presented to the 
competent high court within fourteen days of conducting the election. 159 
Under Section 135, a reply to the petition had to be filed by the 
Respondent no later than six days after the date on which the petition 
was served on the Respondent. l60 Finally, Section 139(1) required the 
Registrar of the Court to give at least ten days notice before the day fixed 
for the trial. 161 It was the contention of Chief F.R.A. Williams, arguing 
for the Appellant, that by applying the above provisions, where an 
election result becomes known on the very day the election takes place, 
if all the actions to be taken by the parties to a petition under Sections 
119(4) and 135 of the Electoral Act were carried out on the last day 
allowed in each case, and allowance was made for the mandatory ten 
days under Section 139 before the hearing of the petition, then the trial 
court must dispose of the petition on the very day it was fixed for 
hearing. 162 The Supreme Court rightly held that the provisions of 
Sections 129(3) and 1·:0(2) by implication ousted the jurisdiction of the 
court, constituting an infringement of the right to a fair hearing and a 
breach of the entrenched separation of powers in the Constitution, and 
consequently were unconstitutional and void. 163 
This case cannot be the authority for a general proposition that the 
Legislature is not competent to set the time period within which a case 
must be decided. The Constitution, in Section 294(1), provided that 
constitutionally-established courts shall deliver judgments no later than 
ninety days after the conclusion of final addresses. l64 Speedy trial is 
always an aspect of a fair hearing. 165 The Constitution also empowers the 
National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly to prescribe the 
practice and procedure of the various courts in Nigeria. 166 The Unongo 
decision was only justified because there were inherent contradictions in 
the provisions of the Electoral Act of 1982 making it impracticable for 
any court to comply with the limitation period. Speedy trials in 
corruption cases are essential because witnesses may die or move outside 






163. ld. at 347. 
164. CONSTITUTION, Art. 294(1) (1999) (Nigeria). 
165. See Ariori v. Eiemo, [1983]1 S.C.N.L.R. 1 (Supreme Court of Nigeria). 
166. See CONSTITUTION, Art. 236,248 (1999) (Nigeria). 
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the government may change resulting in a new policy or change in the 
law. The menace of corruption in Nigeria is such that the public will 
want to know the outcome of cases as soon as possible. Furthermore, 
from the accused's point of view, allegations of corruption carry such a 
social stigma that an innocent person would want their name cleared as 
soon as possible. 
VI. CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE INDEPENDENT 
CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED OFFENSES 
ACT 2000 REGIME 
Some of the criticisms of the regime created by the Act relate to the 
Act's provisions, while others relate to enforcement. A renowned 
Professor of Criminal Law, Cyprian O. Okonkwo,167 has offered some 
constructive criticisms of the Act as follows. The Act has no provision 
for questioning a person who maintains a standard of living above what 
commensurates with his legitimate income, or, for punishing him if he 
cannot provide a satisfactory explanation for the additional income. 168 
The Act also has no provision for encouraging and protecting 
whistleblowers.169 A whistleblower's law is a desideratum for any 
meaningful fight against corruption. 
Professor Okonkwo further observes that the punishments imposed for 
the various offenses of corruption are far from severe. 170 According to 
him, corruption is a special malady in Nigeria and calls for very severe 
punishment. 171 The maximum punishment should be life 
imprisonment.172 The judge will then be in a position to determine 
whether to impose the maximum sentence or a number of years 
depending on whether there are aggravating or mitigating factors in a 
particular case. 173 However, the eminent Professor was short of 
suggesting a minimum sentence. 
In addition to the comments by Professor Okonkow, it is submitted that 
in the area of enforcement, the Act leaves much to be desired. A survey 
conducted in 2001 indicated that corruption increased in Nigeria a year 
167. Cyprian Okechukwu Okonkwo, Legal and Institutional Mechanisms Against Corruption in 
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after the establishment of the ICPC. 174 While acts of corruption are 
reported in the media every day, little or nothing is done by the ICPC. 
Before the last general elections, the ICPC informed Nigerians that it was 
investigating allegations of corruption against eight incumbent 
Governors who were aspiring for a second term. 175 Until now, the 
outcomes of these investigations have not been disclosed. In the 
meantime, the Governors have been sworn in for a second term and are 
enjoying immunity under the Constitution. 
In 2002, then-Senate President Anyim Pius Anyim, asked the court to 
order the ICPC to investigate the allegation of corruption he had made 
against the National Chairman of the ruling People's Democratic Party, 
Dr. Audu Ogbe. 176 Anyim informed Nigerians that Dr. Audu Ogbe had 
corruptly demanded the sum of N120 million from him.177 Dr. Ogbe 
admitted to making the demand but said the money was required to 
organize a retreat for members of the PDP. 178 This demand amounts to 
corruption par excellence. A political party should not use public funds 
to organize retreats for party members. The amount demanded was so 
large that it was impossible to expect the Senate President to raise the 
amount from his personal purse. In March 2003, the Chairman of the 
ICPC, the Hon. Justice Akanbi, informed Nigerians that Dr. Audu Ogbe 
was under investigation by the Commission. 179 Presently, nothing has 
been revealed in regards to the outcome of the investigation. Anyim, 
also made a report to the ICPC that Senator Arthur Nzeribe had 
defrauded the Senate to the tune of N22.8 million.180 The ICPC did 
nothing about the report. Senator Mamman Ali revealed on the floor of 
the Senate that he and some other senators were given N3 million each to 
discontinue the impeachment of President Obasanjo.181 Senator Nzeribe 
corroborated the story when he declared that he had collected N60 
million for himself and his supporters for the same purpose.182 There 
were also numerous other open confessions of corruption in which the 
ICPC failed to act, in spite of Section 27(3) of the Act. Section 27(3) 
174. See INST. FOR DEV. RESEARCH, NIGERIA GoVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION SURVEY STUDY: 
OVERALL SUMMARY REPORT 8 (June 2003) (Nigeria), available at, 
hnp:llwww.accountabilitynigeria.org/reports/nigeria%200vera1l.pdf. 
175. Abraham Ogbodo, Governors, Corruption and the Next Election, THE GUARDIAN 
(Nigeria), Jan. 19, 2003 at 18. 
176. Lenuny Ughegbe, N120m Retreat: Anyim Gets Court's Order for Ogbeh's Probe, 
VANGUARD (Nigeria), July 10, 2002 at I. 
177. /d. 
178. Id. 
179. Gbolahan Gbadamosi, Anti-graft Panel Probes Ogbeh, Agunloye, Others, THE GUARDIAN 
(Nigeria), Mar. 21, 2003 at 1,4. 
180. Shola Oshunkeye, The Caging of the Speaker, 'fELL (Nigeria), Nov. II, 2002 at 33. 
181. Chinenye Nwabueze, Dirty Linen, THE WEEK (Nigeria), Nov. 25, 2002 at 19 
182. Id. 
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empowers an officer of the Commission to commence investigation 
proceedings, when there is reason to suspect the Commission of an 
offense under the Act. The officer may exercise all the powers of 
investigation provided by the Act or by any other law. ls3 
Contrary to this authority, the ICPC has only taken action against 
perceived opponents of the President. When the National Assembly 
attempted to commence impeachment proceedings against President 
Obasanjo during his first tenure in office, the ICPC went on the war path 
against the leadership of the National Assembly. In a letter to the 
President, the former Senate President Anyim said: 
I regret to inform you that it is clear to us now that while 
we have clear intentions that the ICPC should be used to 
fight corruption, we did not know that the presidency's 
intention is to use ICPC to protect its corrupt members 
on one hand, and to use ICPC to fight real and 
perceived enemies of Mr. President. 184 
It was against this background that the National Assembly had to pass 
the ICPC Amendment Act of 2002. Explaining the rationale for the 
ICPC Amendment Act, the Senate Committee on ICPC said: 
Past events have clearly proved that the Executive (sic) 
intention is to use the ICPC to fight perceived and real 
enemies through blackmail, harassment and witch 
hunting. Most worrisome is the situation where the 
Executive has carefully and methodically weakened all 
other Agencies of Government like the Auditor-General 
of the Federation and Code of Conduct Bureau, whose 
junctions are critical to the fight against corruption, so 
as to use the ICPC to protect its corrupt members and 
friends. In the case of the Auditor General of the 
Federation, whose functions are essential to the fight 
against corruption, this government has conspicuously 
refused to appoint a substantive Auditor General for 
over one year, and the Acting Auditor General, Mr. Azie, 
who ventured to provide an honest and comprehensive 
report about the financial rot and corruption in the 
system was shamelessly sacked, abused and removed 
from office without delay. The Code of Conduct Bureau 
183. [d. 
184. THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Dec. 24, 2002 at 1-2. 
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has since the inception of this government been 
systematically paralyzed through lack of release of 
budgeted funds for the Agency. It is absolutely obvious 
to every fair minded Nigerian, particularly objective 
public officers and politicians at all levels of 
government, that the Obasanjo government has 
manipulated the ICPC with the active connivance of the 
Commission to inadvertently (sic) convert the ICPC into 
a tool to silence, blackmail, threaten, harass, coarse, 
[sic] whip in line, guarantee loyalty and witch hunt 
opponents while protecting friends, no matter how 
corrupt or devious they are. 185 
The following are highlights of the amendments introduced by the ICPC 
Amendment Act of 2002, as explained by the Senate Committee on 
ICPC. Appointment of the Chairman of the ICPC is to be made by the 
Chief Justice of Nigeria (and no longer the President) on the 
recommendation of the National Judicial Council (NJC) , subject to 
confirmation by the Senate. 186 The Chairman must be a serving (no 
longer retired) Justice of the Court of Appeals and his conditions of 
service must be in line with the conditions of service in the Judiciary.187 
The power to appoint the Secretary for the Commission is vested in the 
Commission. 188 The Commission is required to adopt its own rules of 
procedure for its business conduct. 189 The power to prosecute offenses 
under the Act is vested in the Attorney-General of the Federation. l90 
Furthermore, a close look at the Amendment Act shows that the powers 
of the ICPC were diminished in many respects. The significance of the 
amendments include: the vesting of the power to appoint the Chairman 
of the Commission on the Chief Justice of Nigeria, and the power to 
appoint the Secretary by the Commission itself.191 These provisions will 
enhance the independence of the Commission and restore public 
confidence in the Commission. One amendment that must be severely 
criticized is the divesting of power of prosecution from the Commission, 
and vesting it solely in the Attorney-General. Rather, the Commission 
185. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Advertorial, SUNDAY CHAMPION (Nigeria), 





190. Id. at 39; See also http://www.thisdayonline.comlarchive.php. 
191. [d. 
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should be allowed to exercise the power concurrently with the Attorney-
General. 
On the other hand, some actions of the ICPC which should be 
commended are the investigation of the former Minister of Labour and 
Productivity, Husaini Akwanga, and five other persons over their alleged 
involvement in the $214 million National Identity Card Scheme scam. 192 
President Obasanjo announced the sacking of the Minister during the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Abuj a. 193 The Minister 
and the two other accused were charged in 2003 but the trial has not yet 
been concluded. 194 A second noteworthy achievement is the recent 
arraignment of two Senior Advocates of Nigeria and two others for 
spending N21 million on bribing INEC officials. 195 
VII. ARTICLE II: THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 
CRIMES COMMISSION 
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (hereinafter "EFCC") 
was established in 2002 pursuant to Act No.5 of that year. 196 The Act 
was later repealed and replaced by the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (Establishment) Act of 2004.197 Economic and Financial 
Crimes are defined in Section 46 of the Act to mean non-violent criminal 
and illicit activity committed with the objective of illegally earning 
wealth individually, in a group, or in an organized manner, thereby 
violating existing legislation governing the economic activities of 
government and its administration. 198 Financial crimes include any form 
of "fraud, narcotic drug trafficking, money laundering, 
embezzlement, bribery, looting and any form of corrupt malpractices, 
illegal arms deal [sic], smuggling, human trafficking and child labour, 
illegal oil bunkering and illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange 
malpractices including counterfeiting of currency, theft of intellectual 
property and piracy, open market abuse, dumping of toxic wastes and 
h'b' d d "199 pro lite goo s .... 
192. George Oji & Cletus Akwaya, Corruption: Labour Minister, Akwanga, Sacked, THISDAY 
(Nigeria), Dec. 5, 2003 at I. 
193. Id. 
194. Fola Adekeye, Confessions Of Afolabi, Akwanga And Others, NEWSWATCH (Nigeria), 
Apr. 26, 2004 at 14. 
195. Mikail Mumuni, This Is Our Own Storey, TELL (Nigeria), May 30, 2005 at 24. 
196. Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, (2002) § I (Nigeria). 
197. Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, (2004) § 1 (Nigeria). 
198. Id. at § 46. 
199. Id. 
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Section 6 of the Act stipulates the functions of the Commission as 
follows: 
a. the enforcement and the due administration of the 
provisions of this Act; 
b. the investigation of all financial crimes including 
advance fee fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting, 
illegal charge transfers, futures market fraud, fraudulent 
encashment of negotiable instruments, computer credit 
cardfraud, contract scam, etc; 
c. the co-ordination and enforcement of all economic 
and financial crimes laws and enforcement functions 
conferred on any other person or authority; 
d. the adoption of measures to identify, trace, freeze, 
confiscate or seize proceeds derived from terrorist 
activities, economic and financial crimes related 
offenses or the properties the value of which 
corresponds to such proceeds; 
e. the adoption of measures to eradicate the 
commission of economic and financial crimes; 
f the adoption of measures which includes 
coordinated preventive and regulatory actions, 
introduction and maintenance of investigative and 
control techniques on the prevention of economic and 
financial related crimes; 
g. the facilitation of rapid exchange of scientific and 
technical information and the conduct of joint 
operations geared towards the eradication of economic 
and financial crimes; 
h. the examination and investigation of all reported 
cases of economic and financial crimes with a view to 
identifying individuals, corporate bodies or groups 
involved; 
i. the determination of the extent of financial loss and 
such other losses by government, private individuals or 
organizations; 
34
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j. collaborating with government bodies both within 
and outside Nigeria carrying on functions wholly or in 
part analogous with those of the Commission 
concerning -
i. the identification, determination of the 
whereabouts and activities of persons suspected of 
being involved in economic and financial crimes, 
ii. the movement of proceeds or properties derived 
from the commission of economic and financial and 
other related crimes; 
iii. the exchange of personnel or other experts, 
iv. the establishment and maintenance of a system for 
monitoring international economic and financial 
crimes in order to identify suspicious transactions 
and persons involved, 
v. maintaining data, statistics, records and reports 
on person [sic], organizations, proceeds, properties, 
documents or other items or assets involved in 
economic andfinancial crimes; 
vi. undertaking research and similar works with a 
view to determining the manifestation, extent, 
magnitude and effects of economic and financial 
crimes and advising government on appropriate 
intervention measures for combating same 
k. dealing with matters connected with the extradition, 
deportation and mutual legal or other assistance 
between Nigeria and any other country involving 
economic and financial crimes; 
l. The collection of all reports relating [to] suspicious 
financial transactions, analyse and disseminate them to 
all relevant government agencies; 
m. taking charge 
coordinating all the 
activities relating to 
of, supervlsmg, controlling, 
responsibilities, junctions and 
the current investigation and 
l33 
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prosecution of all offenses connected with or relating to 
economic and financial crimes; 
n. the coordination of all existing, economic and 
financial crime investigating units in Nigeria; 
o. maintaining a liaison with [the] office of the 
Attorney-General of the Federation, the Nigerian 
Customs Service, the Immigration and Prison Service 
Board, the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Nigeria Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, the National Drug Law 
Enforcement Agency, all government security and law 
enforcement agencies and such other financial 
supervisory institutions involved in the eradication of 
economic and financial crimes; 
p. carrying out and sustaining rigorous public 
enlightenment campaign[s] against economic and 
financial crimes within and outside Nigeria and; 
q. carrying out such other activities as are necessary 
or expedient for the full discharge of all or any of the 
functions conferred on it under this Act. 200 
Within the short period of its existence, the EFCC has recorded 
tremendous achievements. The Commission, between May 2003 and 
June 2004, recovered money and assets derived from crime worth over 
700 rnillion.201 The Commission has arrested and is detaining more than 
500 notorious Advance Fee Fraud202 kingpins, most of whom are 
standing trial. 203 Moreover, the Commission has investigated and 
prosecuted some high profile cases of corruption, including the case of 
the former Inspector General of Police, Tafa Balogun, who was 
convicted.204 The fiery and indefatigable Chairman of the Commission, 
Nuhu Ribadu, is credited for the achievements of the Commission.205 
200. Id. at § 6. 
201. The Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 
Bangkok, Thailand, Apr., 18 - 25, 2005, Synergies and Responses: Strategic Alliances in Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice, at 38; see also www.efccc.nigeria.org. 
202. The offense is otherwise known as "Obtaining by False Pretence". 
203. See www.efcc.nig.org. 
204. Id.; See also Bamidele Johnson, Tafa 011 Trial, THE NEWS (Nigeria), Apr. 11,2005 
at 21-22. 
205. THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria) selected Ribadu as Man of the year 2007 as a result of his 
personal commitment to the anti-corruption struggle in Nigeria. See Eluem Emeka Izeze, Man Of 
The Year, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Dec. 20, 2007 at 1,2. TELL (NIGERIA) Magazine described 
him as the unusual Crime Fighter. See Olu Ojewale, The Unusual Crime Fighter, TELL(NIGERIA), 
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Nevertheless, it is a well-known secret that the President's approval is 
required before any top political office holder can be investigated. 
VIII. THE ISSUE OF POLITICAL WILL TO FIGHT 
CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA 
No anti-corruption mechanism or strategy will succeed without strong 
leadership and political will. Political leadership is required to both set 
an example and to demonstrate that no one is above the law. Unless 
clear and unambiguous signals of support emanate from the top, those 
responsible for administering and enforcing crucial aspects of the 
country's national integrity system may feel inhibited.206 Political will is 
therefore a critical and paramount starting point to achieve a sustainable 
and effective anti-corruption strategy. According to the National Anti-
Corruption Strategy and Action Plan for Tanzania, political will involves 
building legitimacy, credibility, and broad-based political support and 
compliance both in society and within government. 207 Political will and 
leadership, broadly conceived, involves leaders in all walks of life -
political leaders, professional groups, the private sector, trade unions, 
religious institutions, and other civil society groups, etc. However, the 
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of government are the main 
focus of the issue of political will. 
A. THE EXECUTIVE AND THE POLITICAL WILL TO COMBAT 
CORRUPTION 
General Obasanjo, from the beginning, was never committed to fighting 
corruption. As noted earlier, when General Mohammed was assassinated 
in 1976 and General Obasanjo took power, he abrogated the Corrupt 
Practices Decree No. 38 of 1975 and discontinued General Mohammed's 
anti-corruption program.208 This action brought an end to the war against 
corruption initiated by General Mohammed. 
Jan. 16,2006 at 18. THISDAY (NIGERIA), Jan. 1,2007 at 7 also selected him as one of the best 
persons of the year 2007. 
206. See JEREMY POPE, TI SOURCE BOOK 2000: CONFRONTING CORRUPTION: THE ELEMENTS 
OF A NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM 47 (2000). 
207. PRESIDENT'S OFFICE, THE NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN 
FOR TANZANIA 10 (1999) (Tanzania). available at, 
http://www.ipocafrica.org/pdfuploads/the%20united%20republic%20anti-
corruption%200f%20tanzania%20the%20nati_003.pdf. 
208. The Decree was repealed by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigerian (Certain 
Consequential Repeals, etc.) Decree 1979 before Obasanjo handed over to the civilian regime in 
1979; See NWABUEZE, B. O. Mll.JTARY RULE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 70 
(mADAN, NIG: SPECTRUM BOOKS, 1992). 
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On Obasanjo's return to power in 1999 as a civilian President, the story 
is almost the same, except for some recent actions. In 2000, there was an 
allegation made on the National Assembly floor that the Federal 
Executive bribed some members of the National Assembly with the sum 
of N500,000 each, to induce them to vote for the impeachment of the 
former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Alhaji Umar Ghali 
Na' Abba.209 Part of the money was physically tendered on the floor of 
the National Assembly. The panel set up by the ruling PDP to look into 
the crisis between the Executive and the Legislature, found that "money 
must have indeed changed hands for the purpose of removing the 
Speaker."210 
In 2002, to start off the impeachment move against the Senate President, 
Anyim Pius Anyim, some Senators alleged on the floor of the Senate that 
the Executive was distributing N3 million per Senator to sway them to 
vote against the impeachment move.2l1 
In 1999, President Obasanjo paid Nll billion to the construction 
company Julius Berger, even though the amount was not in the approved 
budget for that year.212 His subsequent explanation of making the 
payment in order to save jobs was unconvincing. In February 2003, 
President Obasanjo received over N2 billion in cash and other material 
donations (including an aircraft) from individuals and corporations that 
had business dealings with the Government, in contravention of 
paragraph 6(2) of the Code of Conduct contained in part 1 of the Fifth 
Schedule to the 1999 Constitution.213 Also contravened was Section 221 
of the Constitution, which provides that, "No association, other than a 
political party, shall canvass for votes for any candidate at any election 
or contribute to the funds of any political party or to the election 
expenses of any candidate at an election."214 Some of the donations 
further violated Section 38(2) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 
1990, which prohibits a registered company from directly or indirectly 
making a donation or gift of property or funds to a political party or for 
any political purpose.215 
209. Ayodele Akinkuotu, Obasanjo in Trouble, TELL (Nigeria), Nov. 20, 2000 at 20. 
210. V ANaUARD (Nigeria), The Ekwueme Panel's Report on the Crisis Between the Legislature 
and the Executive, Dec. 22, 2000 at 15. 
211. Chinenye Nwabueze, Dirty Linen, THE WEEK (Nigeria), Nov. 25, 2002 at 19. 
212. TELL (Nigeria), Feb. 7, 2000 at 12. 
213. Ehichioya Ezomon & Fred Okoror, Campaign Finance: Donations or Buying Up the 
Democratic Process, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Jan. 24, 2003 at 23. 
214. CONSTITUTION, Art. 221 (1999) (Nigeria). 
215. THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Jan. 24, 2003 at 22.; THE WEEK (Nigeria), Apr. 7, 2003 
at 10-12. 
38
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 14 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol14/iss1/6
200S] COMBATING CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA 137 
In President Obasanjo's desperate bid for a second term in office, he 
threw integrity to the wind and restored himself to power at any cost. In 
2001, he doctored the Electoral Act sent to him by the National 
Assembly for assent. He smuggled a clause into Section SO(1) that said 
"new political parties can only participate in the general elections after 
2003."216 His calculation was that the existing political parties were too 
weak to pose a threat to his ambition. The Act was later repealed when 
the fraud was discovered and a new one without the clause was 
enacted.217 
Immediately before the PDP primaries for the 2003 general elections, 
President Obasanjo engineered an amendment to the PDP Constitution, 
which made the field uneven for him and other contestants.218 The party 
introduced Section IS(A)(iv) which provided that "All Ministers, 
Ambassadors, Special Advisers and Special Assistants to the President 
and the Vice President and all chairmen of Boards of Federal parastatals 
who are members of the party" shall become voting participants at the 
national convention.219 
The PDP national convention for the selection of the Party's Presidential 
candidate went to the highest bidder.220 Delegates were intimidated by 
the use of serially numbered ballot papers, which made it possible to 
determine how each delegate voted.221 
The election proper that saw the "re-election" of President Obasanjo for 
a second term in office was a monumental fraud. The Presidential 
candidate of the National Conscience Party, Chief Gani Fawehinmi, said 
of the election: 
I have never seen the kind of electoral malpractices like 
the one that took place in Nigeria during the last 
elections. We have heard of rigging in some smaller 
scale before, but when it becomes a conscious act of 
216. NEWS WATCH (Nigeria), Dec. 24, 2001 at 47-48. 
217. [d. 
218. JideAjani, PDP's Mid-term Convention of Intrigues, VANGUARD (Nigeria), Dec. 12,2003 
at 17,22. 
219. Id. 
220. This is however not peculiar to the PDP as it has become a tradition for most of the 
political parties in Nigeria; See THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), The Party Primaries: Matters Arising, 
Jan. 17,2003 at 12; See also Reuben Abati, The Delegate, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria) Jan. 5, 2003 at 
12. 
221. TRANSITION MONITORING GROUP, "Do THE VOTES COUNT?" FINAL REPORT OF THE 2003 
GENERAL ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA, at 71 (2003) (Abuja, Nigeria); See also NEWSWATCH (Nigeria), 
Jan. 20, 2003 at 28-29. 
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governance, dictated by the state, organized by the state, 
monumental fraud, figures changed, votes allocated and 
awarded, dubious voting, stuffing of ballot boxes [sic]. 
They used more than 52 methods in rigging that we have 
never seen before.222 
In the case of Buhari V. Obasnjo,223 General Muhammed Buhari 
challenged the validity of the election of General Obasanjo. The Court 
of Appeal found, inter alia, that the election was manipulated in favor of 
President Obasanjo in his home state of Ogun. It found that the military 
and armed police were deployed during the election without justification, 
that there were instances of violence in all forteen states where the 
election results were challenged, and that the Independent National 
Electoral Commission was neither neutral nor impartial.224 The Court 
also observed that notwithstanding that it had ordered the production of 
the original result before the court on the application of the Petitioner, 
the Independent National Electoral Commission refused to produce the 
result before the court.225 A majority of the court, however, ruled that the 
proven malpractices and irregularities did not substantially affect the 
result of the election. Nsofor J.C.A., rendered a dissenting opinion, 
stating: 
... there was not and could not have been afree and fair 
presidential election on 1 ~h April, 2003 in the 
atmosphere of violence, insecurity and intimidation by 
the agents of the r respondent and connived at by the 
3Td respondent in the states touched upon. 226 
The 2002 report issued by Vincent Azie, former acting Auditor-General 
of the Federation, indicted the Federal Government for financial 
recklessness and misappropriation.227 He was swiftly removed for 
exposing corruption.228 In his place, President Obasanjo appointed 
Joseph Ajiboye, who had acted as the Auditor-General of the Federation 
222. Gani Fawehinmi, Worse Than A Lucifer, INSIDER MAGAZINE (Nigeria), Jul. 7, 2003 at 19. 
223. Buhari v. Obasnjo, [2005]2 N.w.L.R. (Pt 910) 241 (Nigeria). 
224. [d. 
225. [d. 
226. [d. at 525. 
227. NEWSWATCH (Nigeria), Feb. 24, 2003 at 24. 
228. Editorial, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Aug. I, 2002 at 12. The editorial, however, 
considered it wrong to insist on the federal character principle in the appointment. 
40
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 14 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol14/iss1/6
2008] COMBATING CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA 139 
for twelve months prior to the appointment of Mr. Azie without 
producing any reports, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.229 
The appointment of Mr. Ajiboye was improper for other reasons as well. 
Section 14(3) of the Constitution states: 
The composition of the Government of the Federation or 
any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be 
carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal 
character of Nigeria and the need to promote national 
unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby 
ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons 
from a few State or from a few ethnic or other sectional 
groups in that Government or in any of its agencies. 230 
Until recently, General Obasanjo had placed the nation's treasury, 
accounting and auditing system into the hands of persons from his 
Yoruba ethnic group, contrary to the letters and the spirit of the 
Constitution.231 Specifically, the Auditor-General of the Federation, the 
then-Governor, and the Accountant General were all Yorubian.232 It is 
important to remember that Nigeria is a highly ethnic-conscious society, 
where few people can raise a voice against the wrong doing of fellow 
tribesmen. 
A recent lecture delivered by President Obasanjo at the 10th Anniversary 
Celebration of Transparency International constitutes another fraud.233 
The lecture entitled "From Pond of Corruption to Island of Integrity," 
painted a false and fabricated image of Nigeria on the issue of 
corruption.234 In 1999, when President Obasanjo came to power, 
Nigeria's score on the Corruption Perceptions Index of TI was 1.6.235 In 
2003, after four years of Obasanjo's reign, Nigeria's score stood at 1.4, 
thus indicating a slide in the scale of integrity.236 This position was 
229. Editorial, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Feb. 10, 2003 at 16 (considered the issuance of the 
Auditor-General's Report by Azie as a watershed as it was the first of its kind). 
230. CONSTITUTION, Art. 14(3) (1999) (Nigeria). 
231. [d. 
232. [d. 
233. See Lecture delivered by President Obasanjo At The 10th Anniversary Celebration Of 
Transparency International, Berlin, Nov 7, 2003, published in THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), 
Nov. 13,2003 at 7-8. 
234. Id. 
235. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION 
PERCEPTIONS INDEX (1996), available at, 
http://www.transparency .orglpolicy _researchisurveys_indices/cpi/previous3Pi_1/1999. 
236. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION 
PERCEPTIONS INDEX (2003), available at, 
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corroborated by a study conducted by the Federal Ministry of Finance, in 
which 65.3 percent of the respondents indicated that corruption had 
grown worse under the Obasanjo regime.237 Where is the island of 
integrity? 
In 2004, a Commission of Inquiry found that the former Governor of 
Kano State and Minister of Defense, Rabiu Musa Kwakwaso, 
misappropriated N850 million of state funds. 238 The Minister retained his 
position until the end of President Obasanjo's tenure. 
However, despite his short-comings, President Obasanjo's has also made 
some bold efforts against corruption, including: firing the former 
Minister of Education, Professor Fabian Osuji, for bribing members of 
the National Assembly with N55 million.239 President Obasanjo also 
brought his weight to bear on the former Senate President, Adolphus 
Nwabara, and, among other things, forced him to resign over the N55 
million bribe.240 Also remarkable, is the firing and subsequent conviction 
of the Inspector General of Police, Tafa Balogun, for embezzling over 
N14 million belonging to the Nigerian Police Force.241 The EFCC 
brought over ninety-two charges against the former Inspector General of 
Police.242 
Nevertheless, the Chairman of the Arewa Consultative Forum, Chief 
Sunday Awoniyi observed: 
The fountain head of our corruption is traceable to the 
spiritual corruption flowing out from Aso Rock. . . When 
a man is afflicted with spiritual corruption, he corrupts 
everyone around him. He prefers to bring near himself 
men who are tainted; men who are filthy and morally 
depraved . .. 243 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpiJ2003. 
237. lNST. FOR DEV. RESEARCH, NIGERIA GoVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION SURVEY STUDY: 
OVERALL SUMMARY REPORT 8 (June 2003) (Nigeria), available at, 
http://www.accountabilitynigeria.org/reportslnigeria%20overall.pdf. 
238. Adamu Abu, Kana May Take Kwakwanso to EFCC, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), 
Dec. 2, 2004 at 4. 
239. Chris Ajaero, The EFCC repon on Wabara and Osuji, NEWSW ATCH (Nigeria), 
Apr. 4, 2005 at 15. 
240. Jd. 
241. Olu Ojewale, The Unusual Crime Fighter, TELL (Nigeria), Jan. 1612006 at 19. 
242. THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Apr. 5, 2005 at 1. 
243. Azimazi Momoh Jimoh, Awoniyi, Mantu Disagree Over President's Crusade on Graft, 
THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Apr. II, 2005 at 1-2. 
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Chief Adetokunbo Kayode, a Senior Advocate of Nigeria, while under 
investigation for allegations of bribing officials of the Independent 
Electoral Commission for W21 million, was nominated by President 
Obasanjo for a ministerial position.244 Recently, two writers, Michael 
Fell and Dino Mahtani, of the London Financial Times reviewed the 
reform agenda of this administration.245 They acknowledged the current 
prosecution of big fish (influential members/government officials) by the 
EFCe. They mentioned former Senate President, Adolphus Wabara, 
Education Minister, Professor Fabian Osuji and former Inspector General 
of Police, Mr. Tafa Balogun, saying that the public has welcomed their 
prosecution.246 This, however, has not deferred them from questioning 
the efficacy of the anti-corruption campaign: 
Yet many Nigerians see the anti-corruption drive as 
highly selective, focused on the President's enemies or 
the politically expendable and doing little to address 
institutional failings. An anti-corruption commission set 
up by the President has yet to bring a successful high 
profile prosecution. 247 
Towards the end of President Obasanjo's second term in office, he tried 
to manipulate the Constitution to extend his tenure from the 
constitutionally- prescribed two terms to a third term.248 This plot failed 
when the Senate defeated the bill to amend the Constitution.249 
On May 29th, 2007, Umar Yar'adua was sworn in as President of 
Nigeria. The April 2004 general elections that ushered in his 
administration were marred by unprecedented electoral fraud and 
violence.25o Human Rights Watch report on the elections said: 
Instead of guaranteeing citizens' basic right to vote 
freely, Nigerian government electoral officials actively 
colluded in the fraud and violence that marred the 
presidential polls in some areas. In other areas, 
officials closed their eyes to human rights abuses 
244. Emmanuel Onwubiko, EFCC Cuts Charges Against Ba/ogun, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), 
Apr. 29, 200S at l. 
24S. Kayode Komolafe, Anti-Corroption War; Beyond Idealism, THISDAY (Nigeria), 
June S, 200S at 31. 
246. /d. 
247. /d. 
248. Tabs Agbaegbu and Chris Ajaero, A Dream Killed, NEWSWATCH (Nigeria), 
May 29, 2006 at IS. 
249. Id. 
2S0. See http/hrw.orglEnglish/docs/2007/04/24/nigeri/S763.htm. 
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committed by supporters of the ruling party and 
others. 251 
President Yar'adua's Attorney General, Michael Aondoakaa, 
undennined the independence of the anti-corruption agencies (i.e. the 
ICPC, the EFCC and the Code of Conducts Bureau) by interfering in 
their prosecutorial powers.252 The Attorney General of the Federation 
was apparently working for the former Governors who had been arrested, 
investigated, and charged with corruption.253 He exposed (portrayed) the 
concept of the rule of law negatively, in order to protect the former 
Governors.254 Transparency in Nigeria, Nigeria's national chapter of 
Transparency International, has said that in Nigeria the rule of law has 
become a fa~ade for impunity.255 Today, the widely held view is that the 
anti -corruption battle has been slowed down by the Y ar' Adua regime 
because the involvement of friends and campaign donors.256 Recently, 
President Y ar' Adua approved the action of the Inspector General of 
Police, who illegally sent the EFCC Chairman (an Assistant Inspector 
General of Police) to the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Study 
for further studies, which is a ploy to ease Ribadu out of office.257 The 
Nobel Laureate, Professor Wole Soyinka, while comparing the tacit 
removal of Ribadu with the assassination of Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan 
said: 
. . . the precarious socio-political condition into which 
the Pakistani people have been thrown echoed in both 
parallel and divergent directions, the blow dealt to the 
Nigerian nation by the "assassination" of the head of 
the EFCC. 
251. Id.(The final report of the Human Rights Watch on the 2007 general elections is entitled 
"Criminal Politics: Violence, 'Godfathers and Corruption in Nigeria" documents the most important 
human rights dimensions of the crisis of governance: politicians and other political elites openly 
encouraging systemic violence; the corruption that fuels and rewards Nigeria's violent brand of 
politics at the expense of the general populace; and the impunity enjoyed by those responsible for 
these abuses that deny justice to their victims and constitute a roadblock to reform.); See also 
THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Nigeria's Politics Mired in Corruption and Violence, Oct. 10,2007 at 9. 
252. Jibrin Abubakar, Aondoakaa Caged EFCC - Transparency in Nigeria, DAILY TRUST 
(Nigeria), Dec. 11, 2007 at 1. 
253. Bayo Bernard, The Aondoakaa Agenda, SOURCE (Nigeria), Oct. 151 2007 at 16. 
254. See THISDAY (Nigeria), Jan. 1,2008 at 7 (considering Michael Aondoakaa, the Attorney 
General of the Federation as the "Worst Exponent of Rule of Law"). 
255. Bamidele Johnson & Ayorinde Oluokun, Time to Face Justice, THE NEWS (Nigeria), 
Nov. 24, 2007 at 22. 
256. Id. 
257. Madu Onuorab, Yaradua O/wys Ribadufor Kuru, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), 
Jan. 3, 2008 at 1. 
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Ribadu had commenced the process of restoring 
dignity to a people whose nation has become a byword 
for the most breath-taking scam in high-places, for 
endemic corruption, contempt for accountability and 
transparency and the abuse of national resources in the 
pursuit of personal and party power consolidation. 258 
143 
B. THE LEGISLATURE AND THE POLITICAL WILL TO FIGHT 
CORRUPTION 
The legislative branch of government in Nigeria has not shown any 
political will to fight corruption. Nigerians play what is called prebendal 
politics.259 In Nigeria, power is personalized. The control of the state 
and its parastatals is expected to translate to instant wealth. The 
legislators are not content with their law making function. They want to 
take part in awarding contracts and running ministries and parastatals 
where they can make money. 
It is an open secret that before passing bills presented by the Executive, 
particularly money bills, legislative houses across the country ask for and 
obtain pecuniary rewards.260 Before passing the year 2001 budget, N500 
million was earmarked for every Senatorial Zone for "constituency 
projects." The legislators would participate in selecting contractors for 
the projects and in the supervision of the execution of the project. The 
question arises: who will exercise the oversight function with respect to 
those projects? 
The former Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Mr. EI Rufai, told 
Nigerians that Senators Ibrahim Mantu and Jonathan Zwingina 
. demanded a N54 million bribe from him in order to facilitate his 
clearance by the Senate.261 The two Senators are not alone, it has been 
alleged that most ministers paid for their clearance. 262 As mentioned 
earlier, the former Senate President, Adolphus Wabara, presided over the 
sharing of a N55 million bribe from the former Minister of Education, 
Professor Fabian Osuji, for influencing the ministry's vote.263 
258. Yemi Adebowale, Soyinka, Gani Condemn Ribadu's Ouster, THISDA Y (Nigeria), 
Dec. 29,2007 at I. 
259. RICHARD A. JOSEPH, DEMOCRACY AND PREBENDAL POLITICS IN NIGERIA 55 (1987). 
260. Salif Atojoko, The Rape of Nigeria, NEWSWATCH (Nigeria), Nov. 15,2004 at 17. 
261. Salif Atojoko, Ministers Who Paid To Be Cleared, NEWSW ATCH (Nigeria), 
Oct. 6, 2003 at 32. 
262. Id. at 22-27. 
263. Chris Ajaero, The EFCC Report on Wabara, Osuji, NEWSW ATCH (Nigeria), 
Apr. 4, 2005 at 15. 
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It is alleged that the multi-national telecommunications company, MTN, 
gives free monthly recharge cards worth N7,500.00 and NlO,OOO.OO to 
every member of the House of Representatives and every Senator.264 
C. THE JUDICIARY AND THE POLITICAL WILL TO FIGHT CORRUPTION 
The Supreme Court of Nigeria has made certain pronouncements 
indicating a strong will to fight corruption. In A.G. Ondo State V. A.G. 
Federation,265 the Supreme Court used judicial activism to sustain the 
Corrupt Practices and Related Offenses Act 2000 as constitutional. If the 
Supreme Court had relied on existing judicial authorities and orthodox 
Constitutional principles, the Act may have been pronounced 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court observed in that case: 
... in our own situation, taking the issue of corruption 
and abuse of power nationally will best serve the 
interests of all and the general welfare of Nigeria, both 
nationally and internationally. Corrupt practices have 
become an overwhelming malaise for Nigeria. It cannot 
be left totally to individual states. 266 
The high courts, however, have been a stumbling block in the fight 
against corruption through the abuse of their power to grant injunctions. 
An Abuja High Court on December 31, 2003 restrained the ICPC and the 
Attorney-General of the Federation from investigating allegations of 
financial impropriety leveled against the former Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, Alhaji Ghali Na' Abba, pending the determination of the 
substantive suit.267 The injunction was granted based on an ex parte 
motion.268 
In 2001 the Senate set up the Oyofo Committee to investigate alleged 
cases of impropriety in the award of contracts by the National Assembly. 
The Committee in its report indicted the then Senate President Dr. Chuba 
Okadigbo and Senators Rowland Owie, Gbenga Aluko, Abubakar Girei 
and Haruna Abubakar for impropriety in the award of contracts. The 
indicted persons obtained a court injunction restraining the Attorney-
264. A member of the House of Representatives, Hon. Haruna Yerima, made the allegation. 
See Martins Oloja, Anti-Graft Crusade: A Road Strewn With Thoms, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), 
Apr. 10, 2005 at 23. 
265. A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Federation, [2(02)) NWLR (pt. 772) 222 (Nigeria). 
266. [d. at 404 - 405. 
267. Lemmy Ughegbe, Abuja Court Stops Anti-graft Panel on Na' Abba, VANGUARD (Nigeria), 
Nov. 2, 2002, at 3. 
268. [d. 
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General of the Federation, the Inspector General of Police, and even the 
Senate from arresting or initiating criminal proceedings against them.269 
The issue reached the point where the Chief Justice of Nigeria had to 
issue a warning to judges who issued injunctions without due 
consideration for the tenets of fairness, equity, transparency and 
responsibility.270 Recently, two senior Advocates of Nigeria, Kayode 
Adetokunbo and Damian Dodo, were arraigned before an Abuja High 
Court for offering gratification to some officers of the Independent 
National Electoral Comrnission.271 On the day of the arraignment, the 
High Court suo motu discharged them without reasonable grounds.272 
Fortunately, the ICPC has appealed against the discharge.273 
The courts in a number of cases render interpretations that protect 
corrupt practices. For instance, an Abuja High Court dealt a fatal blow 
to the Code of Conduct mechanism for fighting corruption when it held, 
without justification, that the Code of Conduct mechanism is subject to 
the Immunity Clause.274 The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in 
Yusuf v. Obasanjo275 may contribute to the breeding of corruption in 
Nigerian's electoral process. In the Yusuf case, the appellant had sought 
to join Corporate Nigeria (Limited by Guarantee) as a party to the 
election petition for its donation of N2 billion to President Obasanjo, 
contrary to Section 221 of the Constitution.276 The Supreme Court, in 
refusing the application for joinder, held that the donation is not a corrupt 
act and does not amount to undue influence.277 The Court should have, at 
least, pronounced on the illegality and unconstitutionality of the action of 
Corporate Nigeria in making the political donation when the Constitution 
expressly prohibits it. 
The Supreme Court has also rendered interpretations that will inhibit the 
anti-corruption drive. The interpretation given to the term locus standi 
by the Supreme Court will obviously inhibit the ability of members of 
civil society to fight corruption. In Adesanya v. The Presidenf78 the 
majority of the Supreme Court held that, despite the enthusiasm of all in 
ensuring compliance with the Constitution, the right of the individual to 
269. THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), May 13,2001 at 18. 
270. THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Nov. 6, 2001 at I. 
271. Mikail Mumuni, This is Our Own Story, TELL (Nigeria), May 30, 2005 at 20. 
272. Id. 
273. VANGUARD (Nigeria), June 24, 2005 at 12. 
274. Joshua Chidi Dariye v Code of Conduct Bureau & 2 Ors Unreported Suit 
No. FHC/AB/JSI507/2004 (Judgment delivered on 6th December, 2004). 
275. Yusuf v. Obasanjo, [2003] 16 N.W.L.R. (Pt.847) 554 (Nigeria). 
276. Id. 
277. Id. 
278. Adesanya v. The President [1981] S.C. 112; 2 ALL N.L.R. [Part I] 1 (Nigeria). 
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engage in such an exercise in court can only arise where circumstances 
of an oppressive or hostile nature exist, and where the rights of the 
citizens guaranteed under the law and Constitution are curtailed or 
invaded or breached by a violation of, or non-compliance with the 
Constitution.279 Accordingly, the mere fact that an act of the Executive 
or Legislature is unconstitutional is insufficient for an individual to 
challenge it in court. An individual must allege an infraction of rights or 
adverse effect on civil rights and obligations, to challenge the 
constitutionality of an act.280 The Supreme Court also held in Nwankwo 
v. Nwankw028 I that a private person has no locus standi to prosecute the 
contravention of the Code of Conduct.282 
Perhaps, Section 35 on fundamental rights in the 1995 Constitutional 
draft provides a way to overcome the problem of locus standi, it 
provides: 
Every person shall have the right to: 
(a) ensure the eradication of corrupt practices, and 
abuse of power; 
(b) protect and preserve public property; 
(c) fight against misappropriation and squandering of 
public fund. 283 
Only the makers of the 1999 Constitution can explain why these laudable 
provisions were not incorporated into the Constitution. 
In any case, the Mrican Charter has come to the rescue. Article 13(3) of 
the Mrican Charter provides as follows: "Every individual shall have the 
right of access to public property and services in strict equality of all 
persons before the law."284 In Abacha v. Fawehinmi, the Supreme Court 
held that the individual rights contained in the Articles of the African 
Charter are justifiable in Nigerian CourtS.285 The Charter submits, that 
where a person has stolen public funds or property, other citizens of 
279. Id. 
280. /d. 
281. Nwankwo v. Nwankwo, [1995]5 N.w.L.R. (pt.394) 153 (Nigeria). 
282. Id. 
283. See Section 35 of the draft 1995 Constitution of Nigeria. However, this Constitution never 
came into force. 
284. Organization of African Unity, African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
art. 13(3), June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CABILEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
285. Abacha v. Fawehinmi, [2002]6 N.W.L.R. (pt 660) 228 (Nigeria). 
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Nigeria are thereby denied access to these funds or property, and they 
can therefore bring action for the restitution of the funds or property. 
Another decision which has implications for the fight against corruption 
is State v. S.A /lori,286 in which the Supreme Court held, contrary to the 
clear provisions of the Constitution, that the exercise of powers and 
discretion vested in the Attorney-General cannot be questioned in court, 
even where the Attorney-General has clearly abused his office.287 It is 
true that this may be the position in England and some other places 
where the Attorney-General is independent and impartial. However, in 
the Nigerian situation, the Attorney-General is merely a politician who 
has no security of tenure. He is normally subject to the whims and 
caprices of his appointer. The Attorney-General may also abuse his 
office for his own personal gain. The former Attorney-General of the 
federation, Kanu Agabi, entered a nolle prosequi in the charge brought 
against former permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Dr. Julius 
Makanjuola, and four others for allegedly embezzling the sum of N420 
million.288 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Corruption is the bane of the Nigerian society. It is a clog in the 
realization of human rights, including socio-economic rights. It turns 
law enforcement agents into violators of the law. Corruption is an 
incentive to violate human rights because it enables violators to escape 
legal sanctions. It enables the resources and property of the state to be 
personalized and privatized, thus depriving the people of their fair share 
of public property and services. Corruption retards development. It 
debases democracy and turns it into an instrument of enslavement instead 
of emancipation. 
Before Nigerian's nascent 'democracy', there were legal and institutional 
mechanisms for fighting corruption. However, this legal framework has 
some obvious defects. The framework focused more on public sector 
corruption. Furthermore, the provisions are so technical and complex 
that in many cases persons who ought to have been found gUilty were set 
free. The different ad hoc measures by various regimes were never 
sustained. 
286. State v. S.A Dori, [1983]. 1 S.C.N.L.R. 94; 1983 N.C.R. 283 (Nigeria). 
287. [d. 
288. Charles Ozoemena. N420m Fraud Trial: Obasanjo Queries Attorney-General. VANGUARD 
(Nigeria). July 25. 2002 at 1. 
49
Ogbu: Combating Corruption in Nigeria
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008
148 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. XIV 
The Constitutional measures against corruption, which include the 
auditing of public accounts by the Auditor-General, and the 
consideration of same by the public accounts committee of the 
Legislature has been rendered ineffective as a result of the absence of 
governmental political will. The Code of Conduct mechanism has also 
been rendered impotent by the Executive and Judiciary branches. If the 
Code of Conduct Bureau was given adequate financial resources and was 
properly operated through legislation, it would stand as a bulwark against 
corruption. 
As a result of the absence of independence in the Legislature, there is no 
effective legislative oversight of the Executive branch. The Legislature 
is endowed with pre-appropriation, appropriation, and post-appropriation 
oversight powers over the Executive. The Legislature should recognize 
that they owe a duty to the Nigerian people. They are not in office for 
personal aggrandizement. 
The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Act 2000 is a 
welcome development intended to cure some of the defects of existing 
laws on corruption as well as meet the new dimensions of corruption. 
However, it is imperative that the Act is amended to include living a 
lifestyle above ones legitimate and known means as an offense. The 
punishments for corruption offenses in the Act should also be made more 
severe. The amendment of the Act in 2002 by the Legislature to make 
the Chairman of the Commission appointable by the Chief Justice of 
Nigeria will restore public confidence in the Commission when 
implemented. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission has 
done well so far but there is room for improvement. 
It would appear that the most important factor in the fight against 
corruption is political will on the part of the Executive, the Legislature, 
the Judiciary, and civil society. Political will is presently lacking in all 
these branches of government because it is difficult to expect political 
will from people who manipulated their way into power. Therefore, free 
and fair elections are essential in the fight against corruption. 
It is true that President Obasanjo took courageous steps in the fight 
against corruption, but his greatest setback is legitimacy in his 
government. This has affected his ability to mobilize the people in the 
fight. Currently, the entire system is one of corruption fighting 
corruption. Furthermore, instead of institutionalizing the fight against 
corruption, President Obasanjo took the matter upon himself and acted in 
a selective manner. 
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The Supreme Court unwittingly inhibited the war against corruption 
through its restrictive interpretation of the doctrine of locus standi and 
the unfettering of the discretion of the Attorney-General. Hopefully the 
Supreme Court will revisit the decisions if provided the appropriate 
opportunity. The menace of corruption has become so dire in Nigeria 
that there should be express Constitutional provisions for the right to 
eradicate corrupt practices and abuses of power. The reckless grant of 
injunctions by the High Courts to stop investigation and prosecution of 
corruption cases must be checked if there is to be a meaningful war 
against corruption in Nigeria. 
President Yar' Adua who came to power through a flawed election 
slowed down the tempo of the anti-corruption war. The Attorney General 
of the Federation under Yar' Adua's regime clearly undermined the fight 
against corruption through his interference in the activities of the anti-
corruption agencies. 
In the final analysis, the battle against corruption in Nigeria can only 
succeed when it is institutionalized and when there is demonstrated 
political will to fight corruption, which is presently lacking. 
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